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Abstract
This dissertation includes three essays on natural resources management with poten-
tial regime shift, which is a rapid and persistent change of ecosystem processes leading
to decline in the economic value of natural resources. The first essay analyzes the im-
pact of a regime shift that reduces the natural growth of a renewable resource and shows
that aggressive management is optimal under reasonable conditions. This is in contrast
to the precautionary principle discussed in recent literature of resource economics. The
second essay focuses on the allocation of risk of regime shift. It is shown that the
regime shift that only threatens a portion of the resource stock causes more aggressive
management, and the effect of regime shift changes non-monotonically as the share of
threatened stock increases. The third essay considers a duopolistic resource market
where the regime shift has asymmetric effects on two Cournot players’ private resource
stocks. Some examples are used to show that Cournot competition causes distortions
that depend on the relative sizes of two Cournot players’ stocks and the share of stocks
that are under the threat of regime shift. It is found that the largest loss in social
welfare occurs in the case where the regime shift affects the entire stock of one Cournot
player’s stock and has no impact on the other Cournot player’s stock.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Regime shifts are rapid switch of system behaviors caused by changes in feedbacks
between system components (e.g., interactions among species or among multiple pro-
ducers and consumers). Examples of regime shifts in ecological systems include shifts in
coral reefs between coral-dominated and algal-dominated systems [25], and in shallow
lakes between oligotrophic and eutrophic conditions [54]. In financial markets, where
the expectations of other traders influence returns, shifts in investor sentiment lead to
shifts between bull and bear markets [3, 53]. Similarly, changes in expectations can
lead to shifts between multiple potential equilibria in the entire economy [2, 7]. Regime
shifts can also occur in social systems (e.g, consumer fads) and in political systems with
changes in governments (literally regime shifts).
Regime shifts are also characterized by hysteresis. Once a regime shift has occurred
it may be difficult or impossible to reverse the process and recover the original regime.
In ecological systems, an increase in phosphorus inputs into shallow lakes can trigger a
shift from oligotrophic to eutrophic conditions but it may take a far greater reduction
in phosphorus inputs over an extended period of time to shift the lake back from eu-
trophic to oligotrophic conditions [56]. Similarly, it may take prolonged good or bad
economic news before a sufficient number of people shift expectations and generate a
new equilibrium.
When a regime shift occurs in a ecosystem, it can have positive or negative impacts
on the benefits that human gain from the services provided by the ecosystem. Of
greatest concern from a resource management viewpoint are cases in which a regime
1
2shift causes a decline in the economic value of natural resources. For example, the local
economy of Newfoundland, Canada relied on the offshore cod fishery for hundreds of
years until the middle of the last century when modern fishing vessels became available.
Then the local economy entered a boom phase followed by a bust in 1992 caused by the
sudden collapse of the cod fish stock. After that, 40,000 people lost their jobs and the
local population decreased by 10% in the following decade.
To study the impacts of regime shift on resource management, this dissertation
develops three closely related models on the optimal extraction of natural resource and
the equilibrium in resource market with imperfect competition.
Chapter 2 analyzes a renewable resource model where a regime shift reduces the
natural growth of the renewable resource, and finds that the threat of potential regime
shift can make the optimal extraction more aggressive or more precautionary compared
to the case without threat of regime shift. If lowering extraction of the resource low-
ers the risk of a regime shift, the resource manager will take precautionary measures
and lower exploitation compared to a case without potential regime shift. Such “risk
reduction effect” (as [42]) occurs when the probability of a regime shift is endogenous.
Moreover, a regime shift will cause future resource availability to be lower, which lowers
post-regime shift harvest and raises post-regime shift marginal utility of harvest. A
forward looking manager will take this into account by reducing the initial extraction
rate thereby saving more stock to increase future harvests (“consumption smoothing
effect”). Finally, a regime shift reduces the resource growth rate and makes saving the
resource a poorer investment because it will have a lower rate of return. A forward
looking manager will take this effect into account by increasing the current extraction
rate and saving less stock for the future (“investment effect”).
The investment effect causes optimal management to be more aggressive, but the
risk reduction effect and the consumption smoothing effect cause optimal management
to be more precautionary. We will see that under certain conditions justified by rea-
sonable parameter values, the investment effect outweighs the other two effects, leading
to more aggressive management in the face of a potential regime shift compared to the
case without threat of potential regime shift. With aggressive management a potential
regime shift will increase current resource exploitation and reduce resource stocks as
compared to the case with no potential regime shift. This result is surprising in light
3of previous literature in which the potential for a regime shift was thought to cause
optimal management to be more precautionary ([15], [21], [28], [42] and [61]).
Chapter 3 focuses on the allocation of risk from a regime shift. The risk can vary
across different pools of a resource stock. For example, oil extraction could be affected by
very different environmental disturbances in Gulf of Mexico, Eastern Siberia or Middle
East. In many cases, when one particular resource stock is under the threat of a potential
regime shift, perfect substitutes from alternative risk-free stocks in other locations are
usually available. In order to focus on the effect purely from the asymmetric allocation of
risk, the regime shift is simplified to a negative stock effect that reduces the availability
of an exhaustible resource.
A negative stock effect reduces the consumption probability frontier, i.e., the in-
tertemporal budget constraint a resource manager is subject to, and influences the
intertemporal decisions on consumption and saving through an income effect and a sub-
stitution effect.1 These two effects work in opposite directions, thus the optimal
behavior could be either more conservative or more aggressive as compared to the risk-
free case, depending on the relative magnitudes of these two effects. The income effect
and substitution effect caused by a symmetric shock offset each other perfectly for the
case where preferences have unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution (log utility)
and extraction is costless.
However, when the allocation of risk is asymmetric, i.e., only a portion of the entire
resource stock is under the threat of potential regime shift, the model shows that optimal
management is more aggressive as compared to the risk-free case and to the case where
the risk is symmetric. Furthermore, the effect of an asymmetric regime shift changes
non-monotonically as the share of risky stock increases. As the share of risky stock
decreases from one so the risk becomes asymmetric, the optimal extraction becomes
more and more aggressive, and reaches an upper limit at a particular share of the risky
stock. Then further decreases of the share of risky stock lowers the optimal extraction.
The optimal extraction reduces to the risk-free level, which is identical to the optimal
level with symmetric risk, when the share of risky stock reaches zero.
1 This is similar to the consumption smoothing effect and the investment effect discussed in Chapter
2. Jones and Manuelli [27] also discussed these effects induced by the risk from Ito process in neoclassic
growth models.
4This model of asymmetrically allocated potential regime shift is extended in Chap-
ter 4 to study an exhaustible resource market with duopolistic competitors. The global
exhaustible resource market is usually affected by social and political conditions that
are different across resource extraction countries. Extractors in countries where expro-
priation of private stocks is imminent [26, 32, 34] face additional risk as compared to
extractors in countries where private property rights are well established and protected.
Furthermore, technological innovation that reduce demand for exhaustible resources in
the innovating country could also have unbalanced effect on the economic values of in
situ stocks between the innovating country and the countries without the new technol-
ogy [11, 12, 14]. Such risk heterogeneity is characterized by potential regime shift that
could be allocated on different competitors’ stocks asymmetrically.
Similar to Stiglitz [59], Cournot competition does not distort the Pareto optimal level
of extraction of exhaustible resource stocks with symmetrically allocated risk when de-
mand is derived from isoelastic preferences and extraction cost is zero. This is because
in dynamic equilibrium the distortion effect of market power canceled out across time,
and there is no ability to price discriminate. However, when the risk of potential regime
shift is asymmetrically allocated on the stocks of two Cournot players, aggregate extrac-
tion in equilibrium would be different from the Pareto optimal outcome in many cases.
Strategic behavior could increase or decrease the extraction in Cournot equilibrium as
compared to the Pareto optimal level, depending on the relative size of the two players’
stocks and the share of resource stock that is under the risk of potential regime shift.
With asymmetric risk, Cournot competition can induce distortions that lead to im-
pacts on extraction and remaining stock, and therefore causes loss in social welfare.
In the risk-free case and the case with symmetric risk, welfare loss is zero because the
Pareto optimal extraction is achieved in Cournot equilibrium. However, with asym-
metrically allocated risk, welfare loss is positive in many cases. When the potential
regime shift only affects a portion of one player’s stock and has no effect on the stock
of the other player, welfare loss starts to increase as the share of the first player’s risky
stock increases. The largest welfare loss occurs in the fully specialized case where the
risk affects the entire stock of the first player and has no impact on the second player’s
stock. When the risk is further spread out to affect a portion of the second player’s
stock (and the first player’s entire stock), welfare loss starts to decrease as the share of
5the second player’s risky stock continues to increase. In the extreme case where both
players’ stocks are completely affected by the potential regime shift (symmetric risk),
welfare loss reduces to zero.
Chapter 2
The optimal management of
renewable resources under the
risk of potential regime shift
2.1 Introduction
Complex systems, such as ecosystems or market economies, are characterized by interac-
tions among multiple components (e.g., interactions among species or among multiple
producers and consumers). Such complex systems can undergo changes in feedbacks
between system components causing rapid and persistent shifts in system behavior. Ex-
amples of such regime shifts in ecological systems include shifts in coral reefs between
coral-dominated and algal-dominated systems [25], and in shallow lakes between olig-
otrophic and eutrophic conditions [54]. In financial markets, where the expectations of
other traders influence returns, shifts in investor sentiment lead to shifts between bull
and bear markets [3, 53]. Similarly, changes in expectations can lead to shifts between
multiple potential equilibria in the entire economy [2, 7]. Regime shifts can also occur in
social systems (e.g, consumer fads) and in political systems with changes in governments
(literally regime shifts).
Regime shifts are characterized not only by relatively rapid shifts in system behavior
but also by hysteresis. Once a regime shift has occurred it may be difficult or impossible
6
7to reverse the process and recover the original regime. In ecological systems, an increase
in phosphorus inputs into shallow lakes can trigger a shift from oligotrophic to eutrophic
conditions but it may take a far greater reduction in phosphorus inputs over an extended
period of time to shift the lake back from eutrophic to oligotrophic conditions [56].
Similarly, it may take prolonged good or bad economic news before a sufficient number
of people shift expectations and generate a new equilibrium.
A regime shift may have either positive or negative effects on welfare. Of greatest
concern for management are cases where a regime shift causes a decline in welfare. For
example, a shift from coral-dominated to algal-dominated reef may reduce tourism and
fish harvests, and a shift from a bull to a bear market can reduce wealth and potentially
trigger a financial crisis. In this paper we analyze the case where a potential regime
shift results in lower welfare.
Early research on regime shifts in resource economics focused on catastrophic col-
lapse with zero utility post regime shift. Cropper [10] analyzed potential system collapse
triggered when the state variable exceeds an uncertain threshold. Reed [44, 45] used
the Pontryagin maximum principle to transform Cropper’s stochastic problem into a
deterministic problem to find an analytical solution. With an exogenous probability of
catastrophic collapse, optimal environmental management is more aggressive compared
to the case with no threat of collapse. The potential to lose the resource in the future
gives more incentive to use the resource in the current period rather than save for the
future (“use it or lose it”). When the risk of collapse is endogenous, optimal manage-
ment is contingent on the shape of the hazard function and the magnitude of disutility
induced by the collapse and can be either aggressive or precautionary [9].
More recent research has analyzed the effect of regime shift that reduces stock but
not to zero, changes the growth dynamics of the stock, or shifts preferences. This liter-
ature has generally found that the threat of regime shift causes optimal management to
be more precautionary. Tsur and Zemel [61] studied a model of pollution in which “re-
versible events” lead to a reduction in post event welfare. They conclude that “reversible
events always imply more conservation” (p. 968), which is equivalent in our terms to
the threat of potential regime shift always leading to precautionary management. This
result follows from the assumption that the hazard rate and the penalty inflicted by the
8regime shift are non-decreasing functions of the pollution level. Polasky et al. [42] devel-
oped unambiguous results for a potential regime shift that reduces the natural growth
of a renewable resource. With a linear benefit function, they found that a potential
regime shift has no effect on the optimal management when the risk is exogenous, and
induces precautionary management when the risk is endogenous. Precautionary man-
agement is also found by de Zeeuw and Zemel [15] in the context of pollution control
where a regime shift causes a structural change in preferences but does not affect the
pollution decay rate. Numerical simulations by Gjerde et al. [21] and Keller et al. [28]
in a potential regime shift for climate change also suggest precautionary management.
This paper builds from Polasky et al. [42] in which a regime shift reduces the natural
growth of a renewable resource. We use a general utility function rather than a linear
function as in Polasky et al. [42]. We use dynamic programming methods to evaluate
the changes in value of harvesting the resource caused by biophysical change in the
resource growth function. This change in value is captured by a damage function based
on the value functions before and after the regime shift. As found in the early literature
[9, 61], the shape of the damage function is crucial to determine how a potential regime
shift influences optimal management.
In contrast with the previous research in which the the shape of the damage function
is given by assumptions [9, 61], we use general forms of utility function, natural growth
function and hazard function to study the shape of the damage function analytically.
We show that damage function can be either increasing or decreasing in resource stock.
Therefore, the threat of potential regime shift can make the management more aggressive
(when the damage function increases in stock) or more precautionary (when the damage
function decreases in stock) compared to management without threat of regime shift.
We find that a potential regime shift affects optimal management through multiple
effects, which have not been fully captured by the existing literature. If lowering ex-
ploitation of the resource lowers the risk of a regime shift, the resource manager will
take precautionary measures and lower exploitation compared to a case without poten-
tial regime shift. We call this effect the “risk reduction effect.” The risk reduction effect
occurs when the probability of a regime shift is endogenous. The risk reduction effect
is the only effect that occurs when the utility function is linear [42].
However, there are two additional effects from a potential regime shift with general
9forms of utility function and resource growth function. First, a regime shift will cause
future resource availability to be lower, which lowers post-regime shift harvest and raises
post-regime shift marginal utility of harvest. A forward looking manager will take this
into account by reducing the initial exploitation rate thereby saving more stock to
increase future harvests (“consumption smoothing effect”).
Second, a regime shift reduces the resource growth rate and makes saving the re-
source a poorer investment because it will have a lower rate of return. A forward looking
manager will take this effect into account by increasing the current exploitation rate and
saving less stock for the future (“investment effect”).
The investment effect causes optimal management to be more aggressive, but the
risk reduction effect and the consumption smoothing effect cause optimal management
to be more precautionary. We provide a condition under which the investment effect
outweighs the other two effects, leading to more aggressive management in the face of
a potential regime shift compared to the case without threat of potential regime shift.
With aggressive management a potential regime shift will increase current resource
exploitation and reduce resource stocks as compared to the case with no potential regime
shift. This result is surprising in light of previous literature in which the potential for
a regime shift was thought to cause optimal management to be more precautionary.
However, similar results to ours can be found in the consumption-saving problem
from standard growth models. An exogenous shock to the general economic condition
that reduces the return on capital would lead to lower future income and encourage
higher saving to smooth consumption over time. On the other hand, this shock would
also cause the return on saving to be lower and discourage saving. Thus the overall
effect of a negative economic shock depends on the relative magnitude of these two
effects, which are sometimes called income effect and substitution/price effect.
In our model of renewable resource management, we find that aggressive manage-
ment can occur for reasonable parameter values. We simulate the effect of a potential
regime shift on either the carrying capacity or the intrinsic growth rate of the natural
growth of a renewable resource. Our simulation shows that a potential regime shift
is likely to cause aggressive management if risk endogeneity is suitably small and the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) is suitably large. Our simulation results
also show that the relationship between the effect of a potential regime shift and relative
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risk aversion can be non-monotonic. It is well known that environmental uncertainty
can have complicated effect on the optimal management [40]. Holding the relative risk
aversion constant, an increase in the variance of a stochastic shock can induce a non-
monotonic response to the hazard [6, 52, 67]. We also find that increasing risk aversion
can have non-monotonic impacts on optimal management.
In the next section we build intuition by solving for a two-period model where
the potential regime shift may occur after the harvest decision is made in the initial
period. In Section 2.3 we consider a discrete time infinite horizon model with a non-zero
probability of regime shift in each period. Section 2.4 illustrates the main results using
a numerical simulation. Section 2.5 contains concluding comments. All technical proofs
are in Section 2.6.
2.2 A two-period example
We start with a two-period model that is relatively simple to analyze but illustrates most
of the important results contained in the infinite-horizon model analyzed in Section 3.
Consider the optimal management problem for a renewable resource stock whose har-
vest supplies the only consumption good in the economy. The growth of the renewable
resource is characterized by a production function f : S ×X → S, where s ∈ S ⊂ R+
represents resource stock size, and x ∈ X ⊂ R+ represents an aspect of the environ-
mental quality. We assume both S and X are nonempty, convex and compact. We can
write the production function as f = φ + s, where φ represents natural growth. For
example, φ = gs(1−s/K) is the standard logistic natural growth function. In this case,
x could represent the intrinsic growth rate g or the carrying capacity K. We assume f
satisfies the following assumptions,
Assumption 1a. f(s, x) is twice continuously differentiable on S ×X;
Assumption 1b. f1(s, x) > 0 and f11(s, x) < 0;
1
Assumption 1c. f2(s, x) > 0 and f12(s, x) > 0;
Assumption 1d. For all x ∈ X, f(0, x) = 0, and there exists carrying capacity K
such that s ≤ f(s, x) ≤ K for all 0 ≤ s ≤ K, and f(s, x) < s for all s > K.
1 Throughout this paper we will use subscript i to denote the partial derivative of a function to its
ith argument, and subscript ij to denote the mixed second order partial derivatives to its ith and jth
arguments.
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A regime shift is introduced as a decrease of x by ∆x > 0. Then by Assumption 1c,
for any given stock level s, a regime shift would reduce the resource production f(s, x)
and the gross return rate R(s, x) = f1(s, x).
Given initial resource stock s0, the stock after growth is f(s0, x) in the initial period
t = 0. The resource manager chooses harvest, h0 ∈ [0, f(s0 x)], which is nonstorable
and consumed immediately to generate utility according to function u : R++ → R. We
assume u satisfies the following assumptions,
Assumption 2a. u(h) is twice continuously differentiable on R++;
Assumption 2b. u′(h) > 0 and u′′(h) < 0;
Assumption 2c. limh→0 u′(h) = +∞ and limh→+∞ u′(h) = 0;
Assumption 2d. −hu′′(h)/u′(h) = γ > 0 (constant relative risk aversion).
After h0 is chosen, the resource stock in the beginning of period t = 1 is s1 =
f(s0, x)− h0. We assume there is a probability of regime shift at t = 1 yielding either
normal growth, f(s1, x), or reduced growth f(s1, x −∆x). The probability of regime
shift is determined by a hazard function λ : S → [0, 1], which satisfies the following
assumptions,
Assumption 3a. λ(s) is twice continuously differentiable on S;
Assumption 3b. λ′(s) ≤ 0.
Because t = 1 is the last period, with a strictly increasing utility function the
resource manager would harvest the entire resource stock after growth, h1 = f(s1, x)
for normal growth, h1 = f(s1, x − ∆x) for reduced growth. The two-period model is
summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Two-period model
t = 0 t = 1
Initial
stock
Stock after
growth
Harvest Initial stock Stock after growth =
Harvest
Probability
s0 f(s0, x) h0 s1 = f(s0, x)− h0
f(s1, x) = h1 1− λ(s1): no shift
f(s1, x−∆x) = h1 λ(s1): shift occurs
The renewable resource management problem considered here has the same structure
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as the standard growth model, where consumption and capital stock correspond to h
and s in our model. A regime shift of the renewable resource growth in our model is
similar to a decline in productivity of capital in the standard growth model.
The resource manager maximizes the net present value of utility from harvest where
period 1 values are discounted by β. Then define X = {(x, ∆x) ∈ R2+ |x ∈ X, x −
∆x ∈ X}, for any (x, ∆x) ∈ X and s0 ∈ S, the resource manager solves the following
optimization problem
w(s0) = max{u(h0) + β[(1− λ(s1))u(h1) + λ(s1)u(h1)]}
by choosing h0. This problem is equivalent to
w(s0) = max
s1
{u(f(s0, x)− s1) + βu(f(s1, x)− d(s1))} (2.1)
where
d(s1) = λ(s1)[u(f(s1, x))− u(f(s1, x−∆x))]. (2.2)
Note that d defined by (2.2) represents the damage to the net present value caused
by the risk of potential regime shift. Solving (2.1) the optimal resource stock at the
beginning of period 1 in the case with a potential regime shift, sRS1 , satisfies the following
first order condition
u′(f(s0, x)− sRS1 ) = βf1(sRS1 , x)u′(f(sRS1 , x))− βd′(sRS1 ). (2.3)
If there is no risk of potential regime shift, or λ(·) = 0, the optimal resource stock
s∗1 in the risk-free case would satisfy
u′(f(s0, x)− s∗1) = βf1(s∗1, x)u′(f(s∗1, x)). (2.4)
Without specific functional forms of f , u and λ we cannot explicitly compare sRS1
with s∗1. Notice that the left hand side of (2.4) is strictly increasing in s1 and the
right hand side of (2.4) is strictly decreasing in s1, thus the optimal solution s
∗
1 is
uniquely determined. On the other hand, by Assumption 1-3, we can see that d′(s)
in (2.3) converges uniformly to 0 on S as ∆x converges to 0.2 Therefore, for any
2 Because f(s, x) and f1(s, x) are continuous and strictly increasing in x, and u and u
′ are continuous
and strictly monotonic, then by Dini’s theorem the convergence of u(f(s, x − ∆x)) → u(f(s, x)),
u′(f(s, x − ∆x)) → u′(f(s, x)) and f1(s, x − ∆x) → f1(s, x) are all uniform on compact set S as
x−∆x→ x.
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sRS1 satisfying (2.3),
3 we know lim∆x→0 sRS1 = s∗1, because lim∆x→0 d′(s) = 0 and
the convergence doesn’t depend on s. Based on this result, we can discuss the sign of
sRS1 − s∗1 at the margin for small ∆x.
We call the management aggressive, unchanged, or precautionary if sRS1 < s
∗
1, s
RS
1 =
s∗1, or sRS1 > s∗1. By (2.3) and (2.4) these situations correspond to d′(sRS1 ) > 0, d′(sRS1 ) =
0 or d′(sRS1 ) < 0, as summarized in Table 2.2. Intuitively, if the damage of a potential
regime shift is increasing in the resource stock (d′(s) > 0), a resource manager would
increase the harvest and save less stock (aggressive management) to reduce the damage.
Table 2.2: Optimal management in the two-period model
Aggressive sRS1 < s
∗
1 d
′(sRS1 ) > 0
Unchanged sRS1 = s
∗
1 d
′(sRS1 ) = 0
Precautionary sRS1 > s
∗
1 d
′(sRS1 ) < 0
In Section 2.6 we show that
lim
∆x→0
d′(sRS1 )
∆x
= λ′(s∗1)u
′(h∗1)
∂h∗1
∂x
+ λ(s∗1)R
∗u′′(h∗1)
∂h∗1
∂x
+ λ(s∗1)u
′(h∗1)
∂R∗
∂x
(2.5)
where h∗1 = f(s∗1, x) and R∗ = R(s∗1, x) = f1(s∗1, x). Then the management is aggressive
at the margin, or lim∆x→0 d′(sRS1 )/∆x > 0, if and only if the following condition is true
γξh︸︷︷︸
Consumption smoothing
+ θξh︸︷︷︸
Risk reduction
< ξR︸︷︷︸
Investment
(2.6)
where
ξh =
∂h∗1
∂x
x
h∗1
ξR =
∂R∗
∂x
x
R∗
θ = −λ
′(s∗1)h∗1
λ(s∗1)R∗
.
If the risk is exogenous (λ′ = 0), then θ = 0, and the optimal management strategy
is determined by the relative magnitudes of ξR and γξh. ξR is the elasticity of gross
return rate (R∗) with respect to x. The regime shift should it occur will reduce the gross
return rate, thus the resource stock will become a poorer investment after the regime
shift. The resource manager will take this effect into account by increasing the harvest
in the initial period and save less resource stock for the future (the “investment effect”).
3 The arguments here are not sufficient to establish the uniqueness of the solutions to (2.3).
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ξh is the elasticity of optimal harvest (h
∗
1) with respect to x. The regime shift should it
occur will also cause lower resource availability, which lowers post-regime shift harvest
and raises post-regime shift marginal utility of harvest. The resource manager will take
this effect into account by reducing the harvest in the initial period thereby saving
more stock to smooth harvests across time. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution
(EIS), 1/γ, measures the optimal intertemporal adjustment of consumption in response
to the fluctuation of the gross return rate. Thus γ serves as a unit adjustment factor
such that γξh and ξR are comparable. We call γξh the “consumption smoothing effect”.
Lower EIS (1/γ) implies that the fluctuation of the gross return rate has less impact on
consumption.
When the risk is endogenous (λ′ < 0), then θ > 0. By lowering harvest the resource
manager can lower the risk of regime shift, and thus will tend to make optimal man-
agement less aggressive. We call this effect the “risk reduction effect.” With a positive
risk reduction effect the aggressive management condition (2.6) is less likely to hold,
and the optimal management is more likely to be precautionary.
In this two-period model we focused on the optimal resource stock sRS1 under the
risk of potential regime shift. We found that sRS1 can be either greater than, equal to, or
lower than the risk-free optimal resource stock s∗1, depending on relative magnitudes of
consumption smoothing effect, investment effect, and risk reduction effect. In the next
section, we will extend the two-period model to an infinite horizon model, and discuss
how a potential regime shift will affect the resource stock in the steady state.
2.3 The infinite horizon model
We begin by briefly reviewing the classical renewable resource management problem
in a risk-free environment. Then we introduce the risk of potential regime shift and
show what impact it has on optimal management at the margin. We derive a condition
under which the pre-shift optimal management is aggressive compared with the risk-free
situation.
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2.3.1 Classical renewable resource management problem
Given the initial resource stock, s0, the resource manager chooses the optimal plan of
harvests (ht)t≥0 to solve the following optimization problem
V (s0) = max
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ht) (2.7)
subject to
st+1 = f(st, x)− ht (2.8)
and nonnegativity constraints.
An equivalent dynamic programming problem is characterized by the following Bell-
man equation
V (st, x) = max
st+1∈Γ(st, x)
{u(f(st, x)− st+1) + βV (st+1, x)} (2.9)
where
Γ(st, x) = {st+1 ∈ S | 0 ≤ st+1 ≤ f(st, x)}. (2.10)
Here we treat x as another state variable. The optimal policy for the Bellman equation
is defined as
g(s, x) = {y ∈ Γ(s, x) |V (s, x) = u(f(s, x)− y) + βV (y, x)}. (2.11)
The first order condition of (2.9) is4
u′(f(s, x)− g(s, x)) = βV1(g(s, x), x). (2.12)
Thus g(s, x) is chosen such that the marginal value of harvest in current period and
shadow value of the resource stock in the next period are equalized. The envelope
condition of (2.9) is
V1(s, x) = u
′(f(s, x)− g(s, x))f1(s, x). (2.13)
From (2.12) and (2.13) we can solve the Euler equation
u′(ht) = βf1(st+1, x)u′(ht+1) (2.14)
4 We assume that V (s, x) is continuous and strictly increasing in both arguments, and strictly
concave and continuously differentiable in s; and g(s, x) is a continuous single-valued function (see
Section 5.1 of 60).
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The solution of (2.9) is characterized by the Euler equation (2.14) and a transversality
condition limt→∞ βtu′(ht)st+1 = 0.
The Euler equation (2.14) shows that the present value of marginal utility is equal-
ized across periods. The Euler equation (2.14) together with the growth equation (2.8)
compose a two dimensional dynamic system (st, ht)t≥0, of which a nontrivial steady
state (s∗, h∗) is uniquely determined by
f1(s
∗, x) = 1/β (2.15)
h∗ = f(s∗, x)− s∗. (2.16)
Throughout this paper we assume s∗ ∈ S exists.
2.3.2 Renewable resource management with a potential regime shift
Now we introduce a potential regime shift. As in the two-period model, the regime
shift is characterized by a decrease of x by ∆x > 0. In the infinite horizon model,
we assume that the regime shift can happen at any time t > 0 with probability λ(st),
and is irreversible. Given (st, x, ∆x) ∈ S ×X, the Bellman equation under the risk of
potential regime shift is
W (st, x, ∆x) = max
st+1∈Γ(st, x)
{u(f(st, x)− st+1)
+ β(1− λ(st+1))W (st+1, x, ∆x) + βλ(st+1)V (st+1, x−∆x)} (2.17)
where Γ(st, x) is given by (2.10). The optimal policy is defined as
q(s, x, ∆x) = {y ∈ Γ(s, x) |W (s, x, ∆x) = u(f(s, x)− y)
+ β(1− λ(y))W (y, x, ∆x) + βλ(y)V (y, x−∆x)} (2.18)
Intuitively, the net present value derived from the renewable resource under the risk, W ,
depends on the resource stock s, the level of resource production x, and the magnitude
of the potential regime shift ∆x. The following result shows that regime shift has a
negative impact on the net present value of resource stock.
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Proposition 1. For any (s, x, ∆x) ∈ S ×X,
V (s, x−∆x) < W (s, x, ∆x) < V (s, x).
Proof. See Section 2.6.
The Bellman equation (2.17) can be rewritten as
W (st, x, ∆x) = max
st+1∈Γ(st, x)
{u(f(st, x)− st+1) + βW (st+1, x, ∆x)
− βD(st+1, x, ∆x)} (2.19)
where
D(st+1, x, ∆x) = λ(st+1)[W (st+1, x, ∆x)− V (st+1, x−∆x)]. (2.20)
By Proposition 1 we know that D(s, x, ∆x) > 0 for any (s, x, ∆x) ∈ S × X. Thus,
similar to the two-period model, the risk of potential regime shift reduces net present
value by an amount βD.
In Section 2.6 we show that W (·, x, ∆x) is continuously differentiable under fairly
general conditions for the hazard function λ. Then solving (2.19) the first order condi-
tion is
u′(f(s, x)− q(s, x, ∆x)) = βW1(q(s, x, ∆x), x, ∆x)
− βD1(q(s, x, ∆x), x, ∆x) (2.21)
and the envelope condition is
W1(s, x, ∆x) = u
′(f(s, x)− q(s, x, ∆x))f1(s, x). (2.22)
Then by (2.21) and (2.22), for any (x, ∆x) ∈ X, a steady state resource stock sRS under
the risk of potential regime shift, if it exists, is determined by
f1(s
RS , x) =
1
β
+
D1(s
RS , x, ∆x)
u′(f(sRS , x)− sRS) (2.23)
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2.3.3 Effect of potential regime shift on optimal management
We are interested in how sRS determined by (2.23) compares to s∗ determined by (2.15).
Proposition 2. For any (x, ∆x) ∈ X, if sRS exists, then
sRS R s∗ ⇔ D1(sRS , x, ∆x) Q 0.
Proof. Because u′ > 0, by (2.15) and (2.23) the desired result follows immediately from
the concavity of f in s.
Proposition 2 shows that the effect of the risk of a potential regime shift is deter-
mined by the properties of the damage function D defined by (2.20). If the damage
of a potential regime shift is decreasing in the resource stock (D1 < 0), a resource
manager would reduce the harvest to increase the resource stock in the steady state
(precautionary management). This result is found in prior paper [61].
However, if the damage of a potential regime shift is increasing in the resource stock
(D1 > 0), a resource manager would maintain lower resource stock in the steady state
(aggressive management) to reduce the damage. We now decompose D1 to provide
more intuition on when D1 > 0, and then derive a condition under which optimal
management is aggressive.
From (2.20)
D1(s, x, ∆x) = λ
′(s)[W (s, x, ∆x)− V (s, x−∆x)]
+ λ(s)[W1(s, x, ∆x)− V1(s, x−∆x)]. (2.24)
We know from Proposition 1 that W (s, x, ∆x) > V (s, x−∆x). With endogenous risk
(λ′ < 0), the first term on the right hand side of (2.24) is negative. Endogenous risk
gives the resource manager an incentive to increase the resource stock in order to lower
the probability of regime shift, the “risk reduction effect.”
The second term on the right hand side of (2.24) depends on the difference be-
tween shadow prices of resource stocks in the pre-shift risky and post-shift risk-free
environments. In Polasky et al. [42] the shadow value of stock is always equal to prices,
which is constant. Therefore, shadow values are equal before and after the regime shift
(W1 = V1), which leaves only the first term. This is why in their model there no effect
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of the potential regime shift when risk is exogenous (λ′ = 0) and management is always
precautionary when risk is endogenous (λ′ < 0).
In our model, the shadow values differ pre- vs. post-regime shift. By the envelope
conditions of W and V , we know the shadow values are W1(s, x, ∆x) = u
′(hw)f1(s, x)
and V1(s, x −∆x) = u′(hv)f1(s, x −∆x), where hw = f(s, x) − q(s, x, ∆x) and hv =
f(s, x −∆x) − g(s, x −∆x) are the harvests in corresponding cases. In our model, a
regime shift has opposite effects on marginal utility u′ and gross return rate f1.
As in the two-period model, the regime shift will cause lower resource availability,
f(s, x) > f(s, x−∆x), thus tending to reduce harvests after the regime shift and raise
post-shift marginal utility. With the potential for regime shift, the resource manager
will reduce current harvest in order to have more stock in the future when marginal
utility is higher (the “consumption smoothing effect”). However, because a regime shift
also results in a lower gross return rate to resource stock, f1(s, x) > f1(s, x − ∆x),
the resource manager tends to increase current harvest in order to reduce the potential
loss of value of the resource stock caused by the regime shift (the “investment effect”).
Depending on which of these effects dominates, we can have either W1(s, x, ∆x) >
V1(s, x−∆x) or the reverse. In the following discussion we provide a condition under
which the investment effect will outweigh the risk reduction and consumption smoothing
effects so that the pre-shift management is aggressive (sRS < s∗).
In the risk-free case, steady state resource stock s∗ is
s∗(x) = {y ∈ S | y = g(y, x)}
and by (2.15) we know s∗(x) is a single-valued continuously differentiable function.
Similarly, under the risk of potential regime shift, a steady state resource stock sRS , if
it exists, satisfies
sRS(s, ∆x) = {y ∈ S | y = q(y, x, ∆x)}.
In general the existence and uniqueness of sRS is not guaranteed by (2.23). The fol-
lowing proposition shows that the correspondence sRS(x, ∆x) is nonempty when ∆x is
sufficiently small, and converges to s∗ when ∆x converges to 0.
Lemma 3. For any x ∈ X, there exists δ > 0 such that for any |∆x| < δ, sRS(x, ∆x)
is nonempty and
lim
∆x→0
sRS(x, ∆x) = s∗(x).
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Proof. See Section 2.6.
As Lemma 3 shows, the effect of a potential regime shift on steady state resource
stock is continuous. Let h∗ = f(s∗, x) − s∗ denote the steady state harvest and R∗ =
f1(s
∗, x) denote the steady state gross return rate in the risk-free case, the following
proposition provides a condition under which the optimal management is aggressive
under the risk of a potential regime shift.
Proposition 4. (Aggressive management condition) There exists δ > 0 such that ∆x ∈
(0, δ) implies sRS < s∗, if the following condition is true
γξ∗h︸︷︷︸
Consumption smoothing
+ Θξ∗h︸︷︷︸
Risk reduction
<
R∗
R∗ − κξ
∗
R︸ ︷︷ ︸
Investment
(2.25)
where
ξ∗h =
∂h∗
∂x
x
h∗
ξ∗R =
∂R∗
∂x
x
R∗
Θ = − λ
′(s∗)h∗
λ(s∗)(R∗ − 1 + λ(s∗))
and κ ∈ (0, 1) is the eigenvalue of dynamic system (2.8) and (2.14) close to the risk-free
steady state (s∗, h∗), given as the following
κ = 1 + 0.5
(
1/β − 1− βΩ−
√
(1/β − 1− βΩ)2 − 4βΩ
)
where
Ω = h∗f11(s∗, x)/γ < 0.
Proof. See Section 2.6.
The right hand side of (2.25) is the investment effect, which is analogous to the right
hand side in condition (2.6) for the two-period model. In the infinite horizon model there
is an additional term R∗/(R∗−κ). Because κ is the eigenvalue of dynamic system (2.8)
and (2.14) close to the risk-free steady state, in the optimal solution the evolution of
the resource stock is approximated by st+1 − s∗ = κ(st − s∗). This means the effect
through the adjustment of resource stock (the investment effect) accumulates over an
infinite future. In the two-period model, the entire resource will be harvested at t = 1.
If we consider the two-period harvesting plan as the solution of a dynamic system, the
resource stock converges to 0 instantaneously after t = 1 without any preservation for
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t ≥ 2, or equivalently κ = 0. Thus the right hand side of (2.25) reduces to ξ∗R as (2.6)
in the two-period model.
The left hand side of (2.25) consists of the consumption smoothing effect and the
risk reduction effect. When the risk is exogenous (λ′ = 0), then Θ = 0. Thus, similar
to the two-period model, with exogenous risk, the consumption smoothing effect γξ∗h is
the only effect that provides an incentive to be more precautionary in harvesting the
resource stock. When the risk is endogenous (λ′ < 0), the resource manager tends to
be more precautionary because of the risk reduction effect Θξ∗h.
It is also interesting to note how optimal management changes with γ. For suffi-
ciently small γ and exogenous risk (λ′ = 0), optimal management will be aggressive.
For the investment effect ξ∗RR
∗/(R∗−κ), notice that steady state (s∗, h∗) is determined
by (2.15) and (2.16), thus R∗ and ξ∗R are independent of γ. But we can show that
dκ
dΩ
=
β
2
(
1 + β − β2Ω√
(1 + β − β2Ω)2 − 4β − 1
)
> 0
and
lim
Ω→−∞
κ = 0 lim
Ω→0
κ = 1.
Because Ω < 0, we find that κ is increasing in γ and κ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, γ affects
the investment effect only through κ, and the investment effect is bounded below by ξ∗R
when γ is small. As γ increases, the investment effect also increases, but because κ < 1,
the investment effect is bounded above by ξ∗RR
∗/(R∗ − 1).
For the consumption smoothing effect γξ∗h, because ξ
∗
h is independent of γ, γξ
∗
h would
be very small if γ is close to 0. Thus, with exogenous risk, sufficiently small γ implies
aggressive management because the investment effect is bounded below.5 However,
when the risk is endogenous, the optimal management could be precautionary even
when γ is close to 0. Notice that both Θ and ξ∗h are independent of γ. Thus, if −λ′ is
suitably large, the risk reduction effect Θξ∗h would dominate the investment effect which
is bounded above.
The consumption smoothing effect γξ∗h increases proportionally with γ, but the in-
vestment effect is bounded above. Thus, even with exogenous risk, optimal management
5 This does not mean that with exogenous risk and γ = 0 the optimal management is aggressive,
because in this case κ is not well-defined. Polasky et al. [42] showed that when the utility function is
linear (γ = 0) and risk is exogenous that a potential regime shift has no effect on optimal management.
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will be precautionary when γ is sufficiently large, because the consumption smoothing
effect will dominate the investment effect.
2.4 Examples: the potential regime shift on carrying ca-
pacity and intrinsic growth rate
In this section we illustrate the main model results using a standard constant relative
risk aversion utility function
u(h) =
h1−γ
1− γ
and a resource production function f = φ+ s where
φ = gs
(
1− s
K
)
is the standard logistic natural growth function with carrying capacity K and intrinsic
growth rate g. A regime shift can be characterized by either a reduction of K by ∆K,
or a reduction of g by ∆g.
By equation (2.15), the risk-free steady state resource stock is
s∗ = K
(
β(1 + g)− 1
2βg
)
. (2.26)
We assume β(1 + g) > 1 to ensure that a strictly positive risk-free steady state resource
stock s∗ exists.
We use the following hazard function
λ(s) =
2λ
1 + exp(η(s/s∗ − 1)) .
Clearly λ(s∗) = λ and λ′(s∗) = −0.5λη/s∗. Given λ ∈ (0, 1), the risk is exogenous when
η = 0 and endogenous when η > 0.
We are interested in characterizing how the steady state resource stock is affected
by the regime shift. Based on (2.26), the steady state harvest is h∗ = f(s∗, x)− s∗ and
the steady state gross return rate is R∗ = f1(s∗, x). Using definitions given in (2.25)
and evaluating a potential regime shift in carrying capacity K or intrinsic growth rate
23
g, we find that
(ξ∗R/ξ
∗
h)|x=K = 1− β + βg (2.27)
(ξ∗R/ξ
∗
h)|x=g = 1− β. (2.28)
Because βg > 0, the investment effect is relatively stronger for the regime shift on
K. Thus, it is more likely that a regime shift will cause aggressive management when
carrying capacity K is reduced compared to the case with a reduction in intrinsic growth
rate g.
We set discount factor β = 0.98. The estimates of EIS (1/γ) vary considerably in
recent literature, and we consider γ in the range (0, 3).6 We normalize carrying
capacity at K = 100, and set the intrinsic growth rate g at 0.05, 0.2, or 0.5.7 To
characterize the probability of a potential regime shift, we set λ = 0.1, so when s = s∗
the probability of regime shift is 10%. The risk endogeneity value, η, is set at 0, 1, 2, 3,
or 4. These parameter values are summarized in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Key parameter values
Preference Resource production Hazard function
β γ K g λ η
0.98 0 – 3 100 0.05, 0.2, 0.5 0.1 0, 1, 2, 3, 4
2.4.1 The effect of potential regime shift on steady state
We assume the regime shift will cause a 5% reduction on either K or g. We numerically
solve the Bellman equations (2.9) and (2.17).8 Figure 2.1 shows simulation results for a
6 Mulligan [36] used U.S. national account data and estimated that EIS ranges from 0.49 to 2.05
with different specifications. Vissing-Jorgensen [65] estimates EIS using micro data from the U.S.
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), and found that EIS is around 0.3-0.4 for stockholders and 0.8-1
for bondholders. Gruber [22] also used the CEX data but considered the variation across individuals in
the capital income tax rate. His estimates of EIS vary from 1.54 to 2.36.
7 The intrinsic growth rate g of marine fish species varies from 0.025 to 0.75 [8]. Musick [37]
suggested that g ≥ 0.5 implies that a fish species has high resilience to fishing pressure, and g ≤ 0.05
implies low resilience to fishing pressure.
8 To numerically solve the Bellman equations, we use the COMPECON toolbox developed by
Miranda and Fackler [35]. The solver “dpsolve” is modified to incorporate state-dependent discount
rate. The codes are available upon request.
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potential regime shift on g, and Figure 2.2 shows simulation results for a potential regime
shift on K. Both figures plot the percentage change of steady state stock (s∗−sRS)/s∗%
against γ, for η =0, 1, 2, 3 and 4 and g = 0.05, 0.2 and 0.5. Values above 0 indicate
aggressive management while values below 0 indicate precautionary management.
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The simulations show that higher values of η (greater endogeneity of risk) shift the
curve downward, making optimal management more precautionary. As predicted by
(2.27) and (2.28), the regime shift on K causes aggressive management more often than
regime shift on g (compare Figure 2.2 with Figure 2.1). This result occurs because,
ceteris paribus, the regime shift on K has a relatively stronger investment effect.
For the regime shift on g, Figure 2.1 shows that optimal management is mostly
precautionary. However, when the intrinsic growth rate is very low (g = 0.05), aggressive
management is optimal with exogenous risk and when γ is lower than approximately
0.4.
For the regime shift on K, Figure 2.2 shows that aggressive management is possible
for many reasonable combinations of γ, g and η. For γ < 2, the simulations show
that optimal management is aggressive with exogenous risk and for combinations of low
value of g and η. However, when γ is sufficiently high, optimal management is always
precautionary.
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Figure 2.1 and 2.2 also shows that the effect of a potential regime shift can change
non-monotonically as γ increases. When γ is very small, the consumption smoothing
effect is close to 0. Thus, if the risk reduction effect is stronger than the investment
effect, the optimal management is precautionary. As γ increases, both the consumption
smoothing effect and the investment effect increase, but the risk reduction effect is
independent of γ. Because the investment effect increases relatively faster than the
consumption smoothing effect in the beginning, optimal management becomes more
aggressive as γ increases. However, the investment effect is bounded above but the
consumption smoothing effect increases proportionally in γ. Thus, when γ is sufficiently
large, the consumption smoothing effect will become dominant and optimal management
will become more precautionary as γ increases.
2.4.2 The effect of potential regime shift on transition path
We also simulate the optimal transition path of stock and harvest (st, ht) under the
risk of a potential regime shift, and compare it with the optimal path in the risk-free
case. We assume that the initial resource stock equals the risk-free steady state s∗. In
our simulation the resource manager knows the hazard function, but does not know the
exact time of the regime shift. To illustrate the effect of a potential regime shift, we
present a transition path for the case where the regime shift occurs at t = 60. Because
the date of the regime shift is unknown to the resource manager, the optimal transition
path before the regime shift is independent of the time of its occurrence.
In the simulation we set g = 0.05, γ = 1 and η = 1. The values of the other
parameters are the same as given previously. With these parameter values, a regime
shift on g causes precautionary management and a regime shift on K causes aggressive
management.
The transition paths on stock and harvest with a potential regime shift on intrinsic
growth rate g are plotted in Figure 2.3. If the resource manager is ignorant of the
risk and follows the “risk-free” path (asterisks), the resource stock would stay at s∗
and harvest would equal h∗ = f(s∗, x) − s∗ in each period. At t = 60, the intrinsic
growth rate falls so that the new risk-free steady state resource stock and harvest are
lower (illustrated by the horizontal dotted line after t = 60). After the regime shift,
the optimal management would follow the standard risk-free path that converges to the
29
lower steady state asymptotically. From the transition path of ht we can see that if the
manager is ignorant of the regime shift and follows the “risk-free” path, ht would jump
downward at t = 60 in order to get on the path that converges to the lower steady state.
In contrast, a resource manager who anticipates a potential regime shift that will result
in lower stock growth and lower future harvests has an incentive to build up the resource
stock before the regime shift. Precautionary management results in a smoother harvest
transition path at t = 60, higher harvests and stock levels following the regime shift.
Figure 2.3: Transition paths of (st, ht) under the risk of a potential regime shift on g
The transition paths on stock and harvest with a potential regime shift on carrying
30
capacity K are plotted in Figure 2.4. The investment effect is relatively more important
in the regime shift on K than on g. Because of the decline in the gross return of the
stock post regime shift, the optimal management plan following a regime shift is to
quickly reduce stock level towards the new lower steady state stock level. There are
relatively large losses from having stock levels that differ from the post-regime desired
steady state stock. In the case when the resource manager is ignorant of the potential
regime shift, the harvest level post-regime shift would actually jump up to a higher level
in order to more quickly draw down stock towards the new optimal steady state level.
A resource manager that anticipates a potential regime shift will draw down stock prior
to a regime shift (aggressive management). Therefore, the gap between the stock size
when the regime shift occurs and the desired post-regime shift steady state stock will
be smaller. The upward jump in harvest rates will be smaller resulting in a smoother
harvest transition path when a regime shift occurs. Were the time of the regime shift
known ahead of time, the resource stock would be managed in a way to eliminate the
jump in harvest and have a completely smooth transition path. Without prior knowledge
of the date when a potential regime shift will occur, aggressive management will reduce
but not eliminate the upward jump in harvest when the regime shift occurs.
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Figure 2.4: Transition paths of (st, ht) under the risk of a potential regime shift on K
With endogenous risk, changes in stock size will change the probability of regime
shift. Figure 2.5 shows the hazard rate of the potential regime shift through time for
t < 60 as a function of the stock size (λ(st)) for the cases shown in Figures 2.3 and
2.4. If the resource manager is ignorant of the potential for regime shift and follows the
“risk-free” path, the hazard rate would be constant at λ(s∗) = λ = 0.1. If the regime
shift is on the carrying capacity K, the resource manager who is aware of this risk would
harvest the resource aggressively, and this leads to higher hazard rate. On the other
hand, when the regime shift is on the intrinsic growth rate g, the optimal management
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is precautionary and this would reduce the the hazard rate along the transition path.
Figure 2.5: Hazard rate of a potential regime shift
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper we showed that the risk of a potential regime shift could cause the optimal
management of renewable resources to be precautionary, unchanged, or aggressive as
compared to the risk-free case without regime shift. Our results contrast with those
of other recent papers on regime shifts in systems dynamics that show that a regime
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shift will cause management to be more precautionary [15, 42]. Our model includes
non-linear benefits functions (varying marginal benefits) and a regime shift on resource
growth function, which introduce additional effects into the model. Our model shows
that the optimal management depends on the relative magnitudes of three effects: the
risk reduction effect, the consumption smoothing effect, and the investment effect. When
the risk of a regime shift declines with an increase in resource stock, the resource man-
ager will have an incentive to lower harvest and increase stock thereby reducing the risk
of regime shift (risk reduction effect). A regime shift results in lower resource availabil-
ity and thus reduces harvest and raises the marginal utility. A forward-looking resource
manager will take this effect into account by reducing initial harvest thereby saving more
stock to smooth harvest rates through time (consumption smoothing effect). However,
a regime shift also lowers the gross return rate thus saving the resource stock becomes
a poorer investment. A forward looking resource manager will take this into account
by increasing initial harvest and saving less stock for the future (the investment effect).
Both the risk reduction effect and the consumption smoothing effect cause management
to be more precautionary. The investment effect has the opposite impact and causes
management to be more aggressive. We characterize conditions under which the invest-
ment effect outweighs the other two effects so that a potential regime shift will cause
management to be more aggressive overall as compared to the risk-free case.
In a numerical simulation with constant relative risk aversion utility and logistic
growth, we showed that a potential regime shift can generate more aggressive manage-
ment for reasonable parameter values. In particular, we showed that when the regime
shift reduces the carrying capacity of the renewable resource then the optimal manage-
ment tends to be more aggressive with a potential regime shift. In contrast, management
tends to be more precautionary with a reduction in the intrinsic growth rate.
While the model incorporates a number of effects, we readily acknowledge that
there are additional interesting issues that we have not considered. For example, we
considered a regime shift that affects the growth function but not one that directly affects
the utility function, or has a simultaneous effect on both. We have relied on a relatively
simple hazard function rather than explicitly considering the underlying mechanisms
that may govern regime shifts. There may be additional management approaches besides
simply managing the level of stock that can affect the likelihood of regime shift, such
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as reduction of pollution or investments in environmental improvements. In addition,
it may be possible to learn about the probability of crossing a threshold or to get early
warning signals of impending regime shift [5, 55]. Finally, we assume that there is a
single potential regime shift and that this regime shift is irreversible. In reality there
may be many potential regimes with the potential to flip back and forth among regimes.
Considerations of this sort would complicate the analysis but would not necessarily add
insight into optimal management.
2.6 Technical proof
Derivation of Equations (2.5) and (2.6). By (2.2) we can show that
d′(sRS1 ) = λ
′(sRS1 )[u(f(s
RS
1 , x))− u(f(sRS1 , x−∆x))]
+λ(sRS1 )[u
′(f(sRS1 , x))f1(s
RS
1 , x)
−u′(f(sRS1 , x−∆x))f1(sRS1 , x−∆x)]
= λ′(sRS1 )[u(f(s
RS
1 , x))− u(f(sRS1 , x−∆x))]
+λ(sRS1 )f1(s
RS
1 , x)[u
′(f(sRS1 , x))− u′(f(sRS1 , x−∆x))]
+λ(sRS1 )u
′(f(sRS1 , x−∆x))[f1(sRS1 , x)− f1(sRS1 , x−∆x)].
Because lim∆x→0 sRS1 = s∗1, for the three terms on the right hand side, we have that
lim
∆x→0
u(f(sRS1 , x))− u(f(sRS1 , x−∆x))
∆x
= u′(f(s∗1, x))
∂f(s∗1, x)
∂x
= u′(h∗1)
∂h∗1
∂x
;
lim
∆x→0
u′(f(sRS1 , x))− u′(f(sRS1 , x−∆x))
∆x
= u′′(f(s∗1, x))
∂f(s∗1, x)
∂x
= u′′(h∗1)
∂h∗1
∂x
;
lim
∆x→0
f1(s
RS
1 , x)− f1(sRS1 , x−∆x)
∆x
=
∂R∗
∂x
.
Then (2.5) is solved as
lim
∆x→0
d′(sRS1 )
∆x
= λ′(s∗1)u
′(h∗1)
∂h∗1
∂x
+ λ(s∗1)R
∗u′′(h∗1)
∂h∗1
∂x
+ λ(s∗1)u
′(h∗1)
∂R∗
∂x
.
35
From (2.5) we can rearrange terms to find that
lim
∆x→0
d′(sRS1 )
∆x
=
u′(h∗1)λ(s∗1)R∗
x
(
λ′(s∗1)h∗1
λ(s∗1)R∗
x
h∗1
∂h∗1
∂x
− γ x
h∗1
∂h∗1
∂x
+
x
R∗
∂R∗
∂x
)
=
u′(h∗1)λ(s∗1)R∗
x
(−θξh − γξh + ξR).
Because u′(h∗1)λ(s∗1)R∗/x > 0, aggressive management (d′ > 0) implies γξh + θξh <
ξR.
Proof of Proposition 1. We first prove the second inequality of this proposition. De-
fine an operator T as
(Tw)(s, x, ∆x) = max
y∈Γ(s, x)
{u(f(s, x)− y)
+ β(1− λ(y))w(y, x, ∆x) + βλ(y)V (y, x−∆x)}. (2.29)
As noted in the classical model, V is continuous and strictly increasing in both argu-
ments. Then following standard arguments in literature (Theorem 4.6 of Stokey et al.
60), T has a unique fixed point
W (s, x, ∆x) = lim
n→∞(T
nw)(s, x, ∆x) (2.30)
and W (s, x, ∆x) is continuous, strictly increasing in s and x, and strictly decreasing in
∆x, as inherited from u and V . Also by (2.9), we can verify that (TV )(s, x −∆x) =
V (s, x−∆x) given ∆x = 0. Because the fixed point is unique for any (s, x, ∆x) ∈ S×X,
we know thatW (s, x, 0) = V (s, x). ThenW (s, x, ∆x) < V (s, x) is established because
W (s, x, ∆x) is continuous and strictly decreasing in ∆x.
To prove the first inequality of this proposition, define another operator L as
(Lw)(s, x, ∆x) = max
y∈Γ(s, x−∆x)
{u(f(s, x−∆x)− y)
+ β(1− λ(y))w(y, x, ∆x) + βλ(y)V (y, x−∆x)}. (2.31)
The standard arguments from Stokey et al. [60] ensure that L has a unique fixed point,
and according to (2.9) we can verify that V (s, x − ∆x) = (LV )(s, x − ∆x) for any
(s, x, ∆x) ∈ S ×X, or equivalently
V (s, x−∆x) = lim
n→∞(L
nw)(s, x, ∆x). (2.32)
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By (2.10) Γ(s, x−∆x) ⊂ Γ(s, x), then (2.29) and (2.31) imply that for any w it is true
that Tw > Lw. Thus
lim
n→∞(T
nw)(s, x, ∆x) > lim
n→∞(L
nw)(s, x, ∆x)
and the desired result follows from (2.30) and (2.32).
Continuous differentiability of W (·, x, ∆x). Although the continuity and mono-
tonicity of W are established in the proof of Proposition 1 with standard assumptions,
to further establish the concavity and differentiability of W (·, x, ∆x), we need stronger
assumption on the hazard function λ.
Assumption 3c. Given any twice differentiable function w which is weakly concave
on S, |λ′(s)| + |λ′′(s)| is bounded above by a function Mw(s) : S → R+, such that
wλ(s) = (1−λ(s))w(s)+λ(s)V (s, x−∆x) is strictly concave in s for arbitrary (x, ∆x) ∈
X.
The intuition behind Assumption 3c is as the following. Let V ′ and V ′′ denote the
first and second derivative9 of V with respect to s. For any s ∈ S, we know w′′λ < 0 if
and only if
(1− λ)w′′ + λV ′′ < 2λ′(w′ − V ′) + λ′′(w − V ).
Given that w and V are twice differentiable on compact set S, we know w − V and
w′ − V ′ are bounded. Because w′′ ≤ 0, and V ′′ < 0 as noted in the classical model, the
last equation holds when Mw is sufficiently small. When w is close to V and w
′ is close
to V ′, then the function Mw can be large.
With Assumption 3c, we know that the weak concavity of any function w(·, x, ∆x)
on compact set S is inherited by (Tw)(·, x, ∆x) (defined in the proof of Proposition 1)
as strict concavity, thus the fixed point W (·, x, ∆x) is strictly concave. Then, for any
(x, ∆x) ∈ X consider an arbitrary s0 in the interior of S, because u satisfies the Inada
condition, we know q(s0, x, ∆x) ∈ intΓ(s0, x). Thus according to the envelope theorem
of Benveniste and Scheinkman [4] (or Theorem 4.11 of Stokey et al. 60), W (·, x, ∆x) is
continuously differentiable on the interior of S.
9 Santos [50, 51] established the C2 differentiability of the value function under standard assumptions
which are satisfied in our model.
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Proof of Lemma 3. We first show that the policy function q(s, x, ∆x) converges to
g(s, x) independent of s as ∆x converges to 0. Then use this result to prove the
convergence of sRS to s∗.
From the proof of Proposition 1 we know W (s, x, 0) = V (s, x), then according
to (2.11) and (2.18) q(s, x, 0) = g(s, x). Thus we only need to show q(s, x, ∆x) →
q(s, x, 0) uniformly. Because V (s, x) is continuous on S ×X and strictly increasing in
x, by Dini’s theorem V (·, x−∆x)→ V (·, x) uniformly as ∆x→ 0, thus Proposition 1
ensures W (·, x, ∆x)→ V (·, x) uniformly. With the uniform convergence of value func-
tions, we can use Theorem 3.8 of Stokey et al. [60] to establish the uniform convergence
of policy function and only check the assumptions of the theorem.
Consider a sequence {xn} which converges from below to x. Define functions ωn and
ω on S × Γ(s, x) as
ωn(s, y) = u(f(s, x)− y) + β(1− λ(y))W (y, x, x− xn) + βλ(y)V (y, xn);
ω(s, y) = u(f(s, x)− y) + β(1− λ(y))W (y, x, 0) + βλ(y)V (y, x).
We know ωn(s, y) → ω(s, y) uniformly because of the uniform convergence of value
functions. By definition (2.18)
q(s, x, x− xn) = {y ∈ Γ(s, x) |ωn(s, y) = W (s, x, x− xn)};
q(s, x, 0) = {y ∈ Γ(s, x) |ω(s, y) = W (s, x, 0)}.
Then by Theorem 3.8 of Stokey et al. [60], q(s, x, x − xn) → q(s, x, 0) uniformly if
Γ(s, x) is nonempty, compact, convex and continuous at any (s, x) ∈ S×X, and ωn(s, y)
and ω(s, y) are continuous on S × Γ(s, x) and strictly concave in y. The assumptions
on Γ are satisfied by definition (2.10). The continuity of ωn and ω is ensured by the
continuity of W and V . And Assumption 3c guarantees that ωn and ω are strictly
concave in y. Thus the desired assumptions are satisfied, and the uniform convergence
of policy functions is established.
Now we prove the convergence of sRS to s∗. First notice that (2.12) ensures that
g(s, x) is strictly increasing in s. This implies that the convergence to s∗ from any
s0 ∈ S is monotonic. Then consider arbitrary ε > 0 and Nε(s∗) = (s∗ − ε, s∗ + ε), for
any sL and sH in Nε(s
∗) and sL < s∗ < sH , we have
sL < g(sL, x) < s∗ < g(sH , x) < sH .
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For all s /∈ Nε(s∗), because q(s, x, ∆x) → g(s, x) uniformly as ∆x → 0, we can
pick some δ1 > 0 such that for any |∆x| < δ1, |g(s, x)− q(s, x, ∆x)| < min{|g(sL, x)−
sL|, |g(sH , x)− sH |}. Then the following is true
|q(s, x, ∆x)− s|
≥|g(s, x)− s| − |g(s, x)− q(s, x, ∆x)|
≥min{|g(sL, x)− sL|, |g(sH , x)− sH |} − |g(s, x)− q(s, x, ∆x)|
>0
Thus for all s /∈ Nε(s∗), there exists δ1 > 0 such that |∆x| < δ1 implies |q(s, x, ∆x)−s| >
0.
On the other hand, we can pick δ2 > 0 such that for any |∆x| < δ2, the following is
true
sL < q(sL, x, ∆x) < s∗ < q(sH , x, ∆x) < sH .
Thus
q(sL, x, ∆x)− sL > 0 > q(sH , x, ∆x)− sH .
Assumption 3c ensures that W (·, x, ∆x) is strictly concave. Then applying the theorem
of the maximum we know q(s, x, ∆x) − s is continuous in s. Then there exists some
sRS ∈ (sL, sH) ⊂ Nε(s∗) such that q(sRS , x, ∆x)− sRS = 0.
Therefore, given x ∈ X, for any ε > 0, there exists some δ = min{δ1, δ2} > 0 such
that |∆x| < δ implies sRS(x, ∆x) ∈ Nε(s∗(x)) and there is no s /∈ Nε(s∗(x)) satisfies
q(s, x, ∆x) = s. This establishes the convergence of sRS(x, ∆x) to s∗(x).
Proof of Proposition 4. We want to find the condition under which for any x ∈ X
it is true that lim∆x→0(s∗(x) − sRS(x, ∆x))/∆x > 0. By Lemma 2, this statement is
equivalent to
lim
∆x→0
D1(s
RS(x, ∆x), x, ∆x)
∆x
> 0
or
λ′(s∗) lim
∆x→0
W (sRS , x, ∆x)− V (sRS , x−∆x)
∆x
+ λ(s∗) lim
∆x→0
W1(s
RS , x, ∆x)− V1(sRS , x−∆x)
∆x
> 0. (2.33)
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To simplify the notation, we use s∗ to denote s∗(x) and sRS to denote sRS(x, ∆x) unless
otherwise noted. The rest of this proof is organized in steps.
Step 1. We first consider the first term on the left hand side of (2.33). By (2.19)
W (·, x, ∆x) evaluated at steady state sRS is
W (sRS , x, ∆x) =
u(f(sRS , x)− sRS)− βD(sRS , x, ∆x)
1− β .
Let ∆sRS = g(sRS , x−∆x)− sRS , by Lemma 3 we know lim∆x→0 ∆sRS = 0. Then use
condition (2.12) we can show that
V (sRS + ∆sRS , x−∆x)− V (sRS , x−∆x)
=V1(s
RS + ∆sRS , x−∆x)∆sRS + o(∆sRS)
=
u′(f(sRS , x−∆x)− g(sRS , x−∆x))∆sRS
β
+ o(∆sRS).
Also by (2.9),
V (sRS , x−∆x)
=
u(f(sRS , x−∆x)− g(sRS , x−∆x))
1− β
+
β[V (sRS + ∆sRS , x−∆x)− V (sRS , x−∆x)]
1− β
=
u(f(sRS , x−∆x)− g(sRS , x−∆x))
1− β
+
u′(f(sRS , x−∆x)− g(sRS , x−∆x))∆sRS
1− β + o(∆s
RS).
Then
(1− β) lim
∆x→0
W (sRS , x, ∆x)− V (sRS , x−∆x)
∆x
= lim
∆x→0
u(f(sRS , x)− sRS)− u(f(sRS , x−∆x)− g(sRS , x−∆x))
∆x
− lim
∆x→0
u′(f(sRS , x−∆x)− g(sRS , x−∆x))∆sRS
∆x
− β lim
∆x→0
D(sRS , x, ∆x)
∆x
. (2.34)
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We calculate each term on the right hand side of (2.34) separately
lim
∆x→0
u(f(sRS , x)− sRS)− u(f(sRS , x−∆x)− g(sRS , x−∆x))
∆x
= u′(h∗)
(
f2(s
∗, x) + lim
∆x→0
∆sRS
∆x
)
;
lim
∆x→0
u′(f(sRS , x−∆x)− g(sRS , x−∆x))∆sRS
∆x
= u′(h∗) lim
∆x→0
∆sRS
∆x
;
lim
∆x→0
D(sRS , x, ∆x)
∆x
= λ(s∗) lim
∆x→0
W (sRS , x, ∆x)− V (sRS , x−∆x)
∆x
.
Substituting last three equations into (2.34) and rearranging terms
lim
∆x→0
W (sRS , x, ∆x)− V (sRS , x−∆x)
∆x
=
u′(h∗)f2(s∗, x)
1− β + βλ(s∗) . (2.35)
Step 2. Now we consider the second term on the left hand side of (2.33). By (2.22)
W1(s
RS , x, ∆x) = u′(f(sRS , x)− sRS)f1(sRS , x).
Also by (2.13)
V1(s
RS , x−∆x) = u′(f(sRS , x−∆x)− g(sRS , x−∆x))f1(sRS , x−∆x).
Then
lim
∆x→0
W1(s
RS , x, ∆x)− V1(sRS , x−∆x)
∆x
= u′(h∗)f12(s∗, x) + f1(s∗, x)u′′(h∗)
(
f2(s
∗, x) + lim
∆x→0
∆sRS
∆x
)
. (2.36)
Equation (2.15) implies that s∗ is continuously differentiable in x, and by Assumption
1b and 1c
ds∗
dx
= −f12(s
∗, x)
f11(s∗, x)
> 0. (2.37)
Let κ(x − ∆x) be defined with x replaced by x − ∆x. The differentiability of s∗ in x
and C2 differentiability of f ensure that lim∆x→0 κ(x−∆x) = κ(x) = κ. Consider the
risk-free steady state s∗ evaluated at x−∆x and the risk-free policy function g evaluated
at (sRS(x, ∆x), x−∆x), we have
g(sRS(s, ∆x), x−∆x)− s∗(x−∆x) = κ(x−∆x)(sRS(s, ∆x)− s∗(x−∆x)).
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Then
lim
∆x→0
∆sRS
∆x
= lim
∆x→0
g(sRS(s, ∆x), x−∆x)− sRS(s, ∆x)
∆x
= lim
∆x→0
(1− κ(x−∆x))(s∗(x−∆x)− sRS(x, ∆x))
∆x
= (1− κ)
(
lim
∆x→0
s∗(x)− sRS(x−∆x)
∆x
− lim
∆x→0
s∗(x)− s∗(x−∆x)
∆x
)
= (1− κ)
(
lim
∆x→0
s∗(x)− sRS(x−∆x)
∆x
− ds
∗
dx
)
.
Then substituting the last equation into (2.36) and using (2.15), (2.37), Ω = h∗f11(s∗, x)/γ
and γ = −hu′′(h)/h′(h), we can show that
lim
∆x→0
W1(s
RS , x, ∆x)− V1(sRS , x−∆x)
∆x
=
u′′(h∗)
β
(
f2(s
∗, x)− (1− κ− βΩ)ds
∗
dx
+ (1− κ) lim
∆x→0
s∗ − sRS
∆x
)
. (2.38)
Step 3. By (2.15) and (2.23)
lim
∆x→0
f1(s
∗, x)− f1(sRS , x)
∆x
= − 1
u′(h∗)
lim
∆x→0
D1(s
RS , x, ∆x)
∆x
.
Then
f11(s
∗, x) lim
∆x→0
s∗ − sRS
∆x
= −λ
′(s∗)
u′(h∗)
lim
∆x→0
W (sRS , x, ∆x)− V (sRS , x−∆x)
∆x
− λ(s
∗)
u′(h∗)
lim
∆x→0
W1(s
RS , x, ∆x)− V1(sRS , x−∆x)
∆x
.
Substituting (2.35) and (2.38) into the last equation we have
−
(
1− κ− βΩ
λ(s∗)
)
lim
∆x→0
s∗ − sRS
∆x
=
(
1 +
Θ
γ
)
f2(s
∗, x)− (1− κ− βΩ)ds
∗
dx
where
Θ = − λ
′(s∗)h∗
λ(s∗)(R∗ − 1 + λ(s∗) R
∗ = f1(s∗, x) =
1
β
.
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Because Ω < 0 and 0 < κ < 1, then 1 − κ − βΩ/λ(s∗) > 0. If a regime shift causes
aggressive pre-shift management at the margin, it is true that lim∆x→0(s∗−sRS)/∆x >
0, or equivalently (
1 +
Θ
γ
)
f2(s
∗, x) < (1− κ− βΩ)ds
∗
dx
.
Step 4. Linearizing (2.8) and (2.14) around (s∗, h∗), the system dynamics are deter-
mined by the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of matrix [(1/β, −1), (Ω, 1− βΩ)], and the
eigenvalues κ satisfies
(1/β − κ)(1− βΩ− κ) + Ω = 0 (2.39)
Then by (2.37), (2.39) and Ω = h∗f11(s∗, x)/γ, we find
(1− κ− βΩ)ds
∗
dx
=
h∗f12(s∗, x)
(R∗ − κ)γ .
Then we know
(γ + Θ)
f2(s
∗, x)
h∗
<
R∗
R∗ − κ
f12(s
∗, x)
R∗
.
Define
ξ∗h =
∂h∗
∂x
x
h∗
=
∂(f(s∗, x)− s∗)
∂x
x
h∗
=
f2(s
∗, x)x
h∗
ξ∗R =
∂R∗
∂x
x
h∗
=
∂f1(s
∗, x)
∂x
x
R∗
=
f12(s
∗, x)x
R∗
The aggressive management condition follows immediately. Solving (2.39) for κ, the
desired form is the solution with absolute value less than 1.
Chapter 3
The optimal extraction of
exhaustible resources with
asymmetrically allocated shocks
3.1 Introduction
Exhaustible natural resources can undergo shocks that lead to rapid changes in stocks.
For example, discovery of new oil fields increase oil reserves, while massive oil spills
(e.g., Kuwait 1991, Gulf of Mexico 2010) reduce oil reserves. The risk of a stock can
vary across different pools of a resource stock. When one particular resource stock is
under the risk of a potential negative shock, perfect substitutes from alternative risk-
free stocks in other locations are usually available. This paper analyze how asymmetric
shocks across different pools affect the optimal extraction of an exhaustible resource.
Stochasticity and uncertainty in exhaustible resource models have been broadly dis-
cussed in existing literature.1 Kemp [29], Loury [33] and Heal [24] analyzed the
optimal depletion of an exhaustible resource with unknown initial reserve. In their
model the chance of exhaustion, an extreme case of negative stock effect that wipes out
1 Weinstein and Zeckhauser [66] considered the case where future demand is uncertain. Gilbert [20]
studied uncertain resource reserve and the learning process that updates the subjective distribution of
the reserve. Gaudet and Lasserre [19] analyzed uncertain extraction cost following a Markov process.
Uncertainties of demand, price, and reserve characterized by Ito process are analyzed by Pindyck [38]
and Pindyck [39].
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the entire resource stock and ceases the extraction flow, is always positive along the
time path of management. In contrast, Deshmukh and Pliska [16], Arrow and Chang
[1], Quyen [43] and Polasky [41] considered the case where costly exploration leads to
discrete increments of the exhaustible resource reserves. Dasgupta and Heal [11], Davi-
son [14] and Dasgupta and Stiglitz [12] considered the case where at a stochastic time
a new technology is invented. The new technology is independent of the exhaustible
resource, thus induces a regime switch after which the essential exhaustible resource
becomes inessential in the economy. This causes a sudden decline in the economic value
of the resource stock.
As a departure from previous research where the shock affects the entire resource
stock symmetrically, we consider asymmetrically allocated shocks, i.e., only a portion
of the resource stock is under the threat of a potential shock. In order to focus on the
effect of asymmetric allocation of the risk, we assume that a shock only reduces the
remaining exhaustible resource stock subject to shock by a given fraction.
A negative stock effect reduces the intertemporal budget constraint a resource man-
ager is subject to, and influences the intertemporal decisions on consumption and saving
through an income effect and a substitution effect.2 These two effects work in op-
posite directions, thus the optimal behavior could be either more conservative or more
aggressive as compared to the risk-free case, depending on the relative magnitudes of
these two effects. In our model, the income effect and substitution effect caused by a
symmetric shock offset each other perfectly for the case where the preferences have unit
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (log utility) and extraction is costless.
Because the extraction cost is zero for all resource stocks, when a resource manager
owns risky and risk-free stocks simultaneously, it is always optimal to exhaust the risky
stock before extracting the risk-free stock.3 Under this pattern of optimal manage-
ment, we show that when utility is log, the asymmetrical allocation of shock induces
aggressive management as compared to the risk-free case and to the case where the
2 Ren and Polasky [48] characterized these effects caused by a sudden shift of the natural growth
function in a renewable resource model. Jones and Manuelli [27] also discussed these effects induced by
the risk from Ito process in the neoclassic growth models.
3 When both cost heterogeneity and risk heterogeneity exist, the order of using multiple resource
stocks depends on the trade-off between cost minimization and risk aversion, as discussed by Slade [58]
and Gaudet and Lasserre [19].
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shock is symmetric. Furthermore, the effect of asymmetric shock influences optimal ex-
traction non-monotonically as the share of risky stock varies. In our model a potential
shock does not change the optimal extraction rate when the risk is allocated symmet-
rically and the utility function is in the log form. However, as the share of risky stock
decreases from one so the risk becomes asymmetric, the optimal extraction becomes
more and more aggressive, and reaches an upper limit at a particular share of the risky
stock. Then further decrease of the share of risky stock lowers the optimal extraction.
The optimal extraction decreases to the risk-free level, which is identical to the optimal
level with symmetric risk, when the share of risky stock reaches zero.
In the next section we explain the basic intuition of the results with a simple two-
period model where a shock occurs deterministically in the second period. In Section 3.3
we show that the results in the two-period model extend naturally into the continuous-
time infinite horizon model where the occurrence of a shock is stochastic. We solve
the optimal extraction rate analytically using dynamic programming methods. The
corresponding transition path derived from infinite horizon model is discussed in Section
3.4. Section 3.5 concludes. All technical proofs are in Section 3.6.
3.2 Two-period model with deterministic shock
We start with a two-period model where the shock occurs deterministically in the second
period. This two-period model is simple to analyze and illustrates most of the intuition
in the infinite horizon where the occurrence of shock is stochastic.
Consider an exhaustible resource stock k > 0. Let ks denote the portion of k which
will be affected by the shock in the second period. A resource manager considers how
to use k to maximize the present value of utility from consumption over two periods.
The extraction in the first period is denoted by c, which is consumed to generate utility
according to
u(c) =
c1−γ − 1
1− γ (3.1)
where γ > 0. In the beginning of the second period a shock occurs deterministically.
We consider symmetric shock (ks = k) and asymmetric shock (ks < k) separately.
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3.2.1 Symmetric shock
A symmetric shock in the second period reduces the remaining resource stock from
k− c to x(k− c) where x ∈ [0, 1]. Because the utility function is strictly increasing, the
resource manager extracts the leftover x(k− c) completely. Then the resource manager
solves the following problem in the first period
max
c
{u(c) + βu[x(k − c)]} (3.2)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
The solution to this problem satisfies the following first order condition
c−γ = βx[x(k − c)]−γ , (3.3)
and we can solve that optimal first period consumption is
cSS =
k
1 + β1/γx1/γ−1
(3.4)
where SS denotes “symmetric shock”. If there is no shock, or x = 1, the first order
condition reduces to
c−γ = β(k − c)−γ . (3.5)
In this case, optimal first period consumption is
cNS =
k
1 + β1/γ
(3.6)
where NS denotes “no shock”.
The comparison between cSS and cNS is illustrated in Figure 3.1 with a special
case where γ = 1. As shown in Figure 3.1, the symmetric shock reduces the budget
constraint from y = k− c to y = x(k− c), and moves the equilibrium from point A (no
shock) to point C (symmetric shock).
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Figure 3.1: Equilibria with an asymmetric shock in the two-period model
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The horizontal distance from point A to point B is the standard substitution effect.
The shock lowers the marginal utility (shadow price) in the second period and encourages
the manager to transfer second period extraction to the first period. The horizontal
distance from point B to point C is the standard income effect. The shock lowers
the manager’s available resource stock (overall income) and encourages the manager to
reduce the extraction in both periods. This is because that the resource manager with
a strictly concave utility function wants to smooth consumption over time.
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Substitution effect increases the first period extraction and income effect decreases
the first period extraction. By (3.4) and (3.6) we can see that cSS = cNS if and only if
γ = 1, as the case shown in Figure 3.1 where the substitution effect and the income effect
fully offset each other. However, when γ 6= 1, (3.4) and (3.6) imply that cSS > cNS if
and only if x1−1/γ > 1 or γ < 1. In this case the substitution effect dominates the income
effect. When γ > 1, the comparison of two effects reverses and we know cSS < cNS .
In sum, a symmetric shock that occurs deterministically in the second period affects
optimal extraction in the first period as follows
cSS R cNS ⇔ γ Q 1. (3.7)
This result is familiar in the literature of dynamic models [27, 48]. In the following
we will depart from this standard result to see how an asymmetric shock affects the
efficient extraction plan differently.
3.2.2 Asymmetric shock
In this case the initial stock k comprises two parts ks and kn, and τ = ks/k < 1. In the
beginning of the second period, the shock only reduces the remaining stock of ks if it is
still positive, and has no impact on the remaining stock of kn. In Section 3.6 we show
that the resource manager solves the following problem
max
c
u(c) + β
u[x(ks − c) + kn] c < ksu(ks + kn − c) c ≥ ks
 . (3.8)
Intuitively, the resource manager does not extract kn in the first period as long as
ks is still available. This is because the consumption goods extracted from ks and kn
are perfect substitutes, but extracting ks before kn leads to smaller resource stock that
is under threat of shock in the second period. If ks is not exhausted in the first period
(c < ks), the available stock after the second period shock becomes y = x(ks − c) + kn.
However, if ks is exhausted in the first period (c ≥ ks), the shock would not occur in the
second period, and the available stock in the second period is simply y = ks + kn − c.
Thus the asymmetric shock reduces the budget constraint only for c < ks. As shown in
Figure 3.1, reduced budget constraint is a broken line with a kink at c = ks. Figure 3.1
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presents three cases with different sizes of ks relative to k: high (ksH), medium (ksM )
and low (ksL).
For the case where the shock affects a relatively large share of resource stock (ksH),
Figure 3.1 shows that the asymmetric regime shift moves the equilibrium from point A
to point C′′. In this case ksH is larger than the optimal extraction in the first period,
which is the interior solution to the first case of (3.8) and the corresponding first order
condition is
c−γ = βx[x(ks − c) + kn]−γ . (3.9)
We can solve this equation to find
cAS =
(
1− τ + τx
x
)
k
1 + β1/γx1/γ−1
=
(
1− τ + τx
x
)
cSS > cSS ,
where AS denotes “asymmetric shock”. Note that cAS < ks = τk implies τ > 1/(1 +
β1/γx1/γ).
Comparing point C′′ with point C in Figure 3.1, it is clear that the asymmetric
shock increases first period extraction as compared to the symmetric shock case. To
understand this result, first note that the asymmetric shock and the symmetric shock
cause the same substitution effect, as measured by the horizontal distance from point
A to point B. This occurs because the rate of substitution (slope of indifference curve)
is the same at point C′′ and point C. However, the asymmetric shock causes a smaller
income effect as compared to the symmetric shock. We can see that point B is closer
to point C′′ than to point C on the same income expansion path. Therefore, when the
shock is asymmetric and ks is not exhausted in the first period, optimal management
under the threat of asymmetric shock is more aggressive as compared to the case where
the shock is symmetric.
When ks is as low as ksL, Figure 3.1 shows that asymmetric shock breaks the budget
constraint, but does not change the equilibrium point A. This is the second case of the
optimization problem (3.8), where the portion of resource stock that would be affected
by the shock is exhausted before it occurs. Then according to (3.5) and (3.6) we know
that the interior solution of this case satisfies
cAS =
k
1 + β1/γ
= cNS ,
and cAS ≥ ks = τk implies τ ≤ 1/(1 + β1/γ).
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When 1/(1 + β1/γ) < τ ≤ 1/(1 + β1/γx1/γ), ks = τk is at the medium level ksM .
As shown in Figure 3.1, the asymmetric shocks moves the equilibrium to point C′, the
kink point on the budget constraint where
cAS = ks = τk.
This is the solution to the second case of (3.8) where the constraint c ≥ ks is binding.
In this case the income effect is the horizontal distance along the income expansion path
from point B′ to point C′, and substitution effect is the horizontal distance from point
A to point B′. This result occurs because the rate of substitution is constant on the
same income expansion path, for indifference curves derived from isoelastic utility.
In sum, the solution of (3.8) depends on (k, τ) as the follows
cAS =

k
1 + β1/γ
τ ∈
[
0,
1
1 + β1/γ
)
τk τ ∈
[
1
1 + β1/γ
,
1
1 + β1/γx1/γ
)
(
1− τ + xτ
x
)
k
1 + β1/γx1/γ−1
τ ∈
[
1
1 + β1/γx1/γ
, 1
] . (3.10)
Holding k constant, (3.10) is a continuous and piecewise linear function in τ and plotted
in Figure 3.2 for the special case where γ = 1. This is equivalent to Figure 3.1 where
the same result is plotted on the (c, y) plane.
Figure 3.2 shows that when ks is less than cNS = k/(1+β), cAS is constant at cNS as
ks increases, same as equilibrium A in Figure 3.1. When ks becomes the same as or larger
than cNS , cAS starts to increase in ks. This result occurs because the substitution effect
(A-B′) increases faster than the income effect (B′-C′), as in equilibrium C′ in Figure
3.1. In this case the manager wants to exhaust ks in order to avoid the shock in the
second period. When ks is sufficiently large, exhausting ks in the first period becomes
inefficient and cAS starts to decrease in ks. This is because the substitution effect is
constant at the upper bound (A-B) but the income effect (B-C′′) still increases in ks,
as in equilibrium C′′ in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.2: Effect of an asymmetric shock in the two-period model
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It is interesting to note in Figure 3.2 that, holding k constant, the first period optimal
extraction cAS varies non-monotonically in ks. This non-monotonicity occurs because
that the magnitudes of substitution effect and income effect change differently as ks
increases.
In this section we used a two-period model to analyze how the impact of an asym-
metric shock on the optimal management of exhaustible resource is different from that
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of a symmetric shock. We have seen that the asymmetric shock affects optimal man-
agement through affecting the substitution effect and the income effect. The relative
magnitude of the two effects changes as the share of resource stock that is under the
threat of shock increases, leading to non-monotonic change of the overall effect. In the
next section we consider a continuous-time infinite horizon model where the occurrence
of shock is stochastic. We will see that the results in the two-period model extends
naturally into the infinite horizon case.
3.3 Infinite horizon model with stochastic shock
For a continuous-time dynamic programming framework, the risk-free value of k is
captured by a value function V and is characterized by the following problem
ρV (k) = max
c
{u(c)− V ′(k)c}. (3.11)
where ρ = − log β.
The solution to this problem satisfies
cNS =
ρk
γ
, (3.12)
and the corresponding value function is
V (k) =
(
γ
ρ
)γ k1−γ
1− γ −
1
ρ(1− γ) . (3.13)
In the following we will analyze how a shock that occurs stochastically changes these
results. As in the two-period model, we consider a symmetric shock and a asymmetric
shock separately.
3.3.1 Symmetric shock
We assume that at any time t ≥ 0, there is a potential shock that reduces the entire
resource stock symmetrically from kt to xkt. Given a constant hazard rate λ ∈ [0, 1],
the cumulative probability of the shock occurring at t ≥ 0 is
Λ(t) = 1− e−λt.
Once the shock occurs, the dynamic system enters the risk-free phase.
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Given initial stock k, a resource manager solves the following problem for an in-
finitesimally short period ∆t
W (k) = e−λ∆t max
c
{∆tu(c) + e−ρ∆tW (k −∆tc)}+ (1− e−λ∆t)V (xk)
where W denotes the expected value of k under the risk of a potential symmetric shock
and V is given as (3.13). In the limiting case ∆t→ 0 we have
ρW (k) = max
c
{u(c)−W ′(k)c} − λ[W (k)− V (xk)]. (3.14)
Comparing (3.14) with the risk-free problem (3.11), the potential symmetric shock
causes a damage λ[W (k) − V (xk)] on the value of resource stock k. The following
result compares the solution of (3.14), denoted by cSS , and cNS given by (3.12).
Proposition 5. In the continuous-time infinite horizon model, a potential symmetric
shock affects the optimal management of an exhaustible resource as following
cSS R cNS ⇔ γ Q 1.
Proof. We assume that W (k) = Ak1−γ/(1 − γ) + B. Then the first order condition of
(3.14) is
c−γ = W ′(k) = Ak−γ . (3.15)
This yields
cSS = A−1/γk (3.16)
and it is clear that A > 0. Substituting (3.13), (3.15) and the assumed form of W into
(3.14) we find
(ρ+ λ)A
k1−γ
1− γ + (ρ+ λ)B =
[
γA
1− 1
γ + λx1−γ
(
γ
ρ
)γ] k1−γ
1− γ −
ρ+ λ
ρ(1− γ) .
Then B = −1/[ρ(1− γ)] and A is determined independently of the state variable k by
the following equation
λ
[
A− x1−γ
(
γ
ρ
)γ]
= ρA
1− 1
γ
(
γ
ρ
−A 1γ
)
. (3.17)
This implies (
γ
ρ
)γ
R A R x1−γ
(
γ
ρ
)γ
.
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Because x < 1, the following is true
A
− 1
γ R ρ
γ
⇔ γ Q 1.
Then the desired result follows by comparing (3.12) and (3.16).
Proposition 5 shows that the effect of a deterministic symmetric shock in the two-
period model, as described by (3.7), extends naturally into the continuous-time infinite
horizon model where the symmetric shock occurs stochastically. The risk of potential
symmetric shock causes a substitution effect that increases the optimal extraction and
an income effect that decreases the optimal extraction. When γ < 1, the substitution
effect dominates the income effect and optimal extraction is higher under the risk of
a shock as compared to the risk-free case. When γ = 1, the substitution and income
effects fully offset each other and the risk of potential symmetric shock would not change
the optimal extraction. When γ > 1, the income effect dominates the substitution effect
and optimal extraction is lower under the risk of shock as compared to the risk-free case.
3.3.2 Asymmetric shock
Although the risk of potential symmetric shock does not change the optimal manage-
ment when γ = 1, this is not true if the shock only affects a portion of the resource
stock. Now we consider the case of asymmetric shock where the initial stock k comprises
two parts ks and kn. At any time t ≥ 0, a potential shock reduces the remaining stock
kst to xk
s
t , x ∈ [0, 1], with constant hazard rate λ, and has no impact on kn.
As in the two-period model, the resource manager does not extract kn as long as
ks is still available. We skip the technical proof and use this result directly to set up
the resource manager’s problem. Later we will see that the shadow price of the leftover
of ks is always lower than the shadow price of kn. Thus it is cheaper to use ks before
kn. Intuitively, the consumption goods extracted from ks and kn are perfect substitutes
but extracting ks first leads to smaller resource stock that is under the risk of potential
shock.
For an infinitesimally short period ∆t the resource manager solves
W (ks, kn) = e−λ∆t max
c
{∆tu(c) + e−ρ∆tW (ks −∆tc, kn)}
+ (1− e−λ∆t)V (xks + kn).
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Because sufficiently small ∆t ensures that ∆tc < ks for any c ∈ R++, we do not need to
consider the case in the two-period model where ks is exhausted. In the limiting case
∆x→ 0 we find
ρW (ks, kn) = max
c
{u(c)−Wks(ks, kn)c} − λ[W (ks, kn)− V (xks + kn)].4 (3.18)
Similar to (3.14), the potential shock on ks causes a damage λ[W (ks, kn)−V (xks+kn)]
on the net present value generated from ks and kn. Also it is straightforward to see
that (3.18) reduces to (3.14) when ks = k and kn = 0, or equivalently τ = ks/k = 1.
To solve (3.18) analytically we set γ = 1, so the utility function is u(c) = log c.
In this case, Proposition 5 shows that a potential shock that affects the entire stock k
symmetrically would not change the optimal extraction. However, this is not true when
the potential shock is asymmetric, as shown by the following result.
Proposition 6. When γ = 1 the solution of (3.18) satisfies
cAS =
1− (1− x)
(
1− τ
xτ + 1− τ
)1+λ/ρ
1− (1− x)
(
1− τ
xτ + 1− τ
) ρk, (3.19)
and the corresponding value function is
W (ks, kn) =
1
ρ+ λ
log
[
(xks + kn)1+λ/ρ − (1− x)(kn)1+λ/ρ
]
− log x
ρ+ λ
+
log ρ− 1
ρ
. (3.20)
Proof. See Section 3.6.
Using (3.20) it is straightforward to show that Wks < Wkn as long as k
s > 0. Thus
the shadow price of ks is always lower and it is cheaper to use ks before kn. This result
confirms that the resource manager’s problem is in the form of (3.18).
From (3.19) we can see that with a potential asymmetric shock the optimal extrac-
tion cAR reduces to the risk-free level cNS = ρk as (3.12) with γ = 1 under either of the
following three conditions which ensure a risk-free environment: i) zero shock x = 1; ii)
4 Throughout this paper we use subscript to denote the partial derivative to the corresponding
argument.
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zero hazard rate λ = 0; or iii) no risky stock τ = 0. It is also interesting to note that
when τ = 1, cAS reduces to the optimal extraction with symmetric risk cSS = ρk, which
by Proposition 5 is identical to the risk-free level cNS when γ = 1.
Figure 3.3 plots cAS given by (3.19) holding k constant. Similar to the two-period
model, the change of cAS is non-monotonic as the risky stock ks increases from 0 to k.
When the share of ks is relatively small, the threat of the asymmetric shock encourages
the resource manager to increase extraction to draw down ks in order to avoid the
damage when the shock occurs, and an increase of the share of ks leads to higher
cAS . This result occurs because the asymmetric shock causes a substitution effect that
increases extraction and an income effect that decreases extraction, and as the share of
ks increases, the substitution effect grows faster than the income effect. However, when
the share of ks is relatively large, rapidly depleting ks becomes inefficient as this reduces
future stock availability and leads to very high marginal utility. It is then optimal to
reduce extraction to prepare for the future when the shock potentially causes large
reduction of the resource stock. In this case the optimal extraction cAS decreases as the
share of ks increases. This result occurs because the income effect grows faster than the
substitution effect.
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Figure 3.3: Effect of an asymmetric shock in the infinite horizon model
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3.4 Transition path
The transition path with initial condition K0 = (k, k
s) is given by
(C, K) =(ct, Kt)t≥0 (3.21)
ct is determined by (3.19)
dKt =
(
dkt
dkst
)
= −
(
ct
ct × I{kst > 0}
)
,
where I is an indicator function equal to 1 if the condition in the brackets is true and 0
otherwise.
Figure 3.4 compares the transition path (3.21) with the standard risk-free transition
path. In the risk-free case, ct/kt = ρ is constant over time, as shown by the dashed line
in the top chart. The standard risk-free transition paths of ct and kt are also plotted as
dashed lines in the middle and bottom charts where both ct and kt decrease at constant
rate ρ and converge to 0 asymptotically.
With an asymmetric shock that potentially affects ks = kso < k as shown in Figure
3.3, ct/kt is not constant over time. This result occurs because the manager only uses
ks and does not extract kn as long as ks is available, leading to decreasing τt = k
s
t /kt
overtime. This management strategy, as reflected by Figure 3.3, would cause ct/kt to
increase initially and then decrease to ρ when ks is exhausted. Because ct/kt is not
constant under the risk of an asymmetric shock, the rate of decrease of ct and kt also
vary along the transition path. The solid lines in Figure 3.4 show these results.
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Figure 3.4: Effect of an asymmetric shock on the optimal transition path
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The top panel in Figure 3.4 plots the transition path of ct/kt starting from the initial
condition (k, kso). We can see that ct/kt first increases then decreases to the risk-free
level ρ at time t when ks is exhausted. After that, the transition path follows the risk-
free constant rate ρ. The transition path of ct is shown in the middle panel. Figure
3.3 shows that the asymmetric risk increases the initial extraction to cASo to be higher
than the risk-free level cNS = ρk. From Figure 3.4 we see that under the asymmetric
risk ct is higher than the risk-free level over an extended period. When ct/kt starts to
decrease, ct itself falls rapidly. Having higher ct in the initial stage of the transition
path leads to faster decline of kt compared to the risk-free case, as shown in the bottom
panel of Figure 3.4. When kso is exhausted, the transition path of ct and kt converge
to the standard risk-free path. Because kt is more aggressively extracted in the risky
phase, ct and kc are persistently lower in the risk-free phase as compared to the case
where the asymmetric risk does not exist initially.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the optimal management of an exhaustible resource under
the risk of an asymmetric shock, and compared the results with the risk-free case and
the case where the shock is symmetric. We first showed that the effect of a symmetric
shock depends on the value of relative risk aversion (γ) of the utility function. The risk
of shock causes a substitution effect that increases the optimal extraction and an income
effect that decreases the optimal extraction. If the shock is symmetric, the substitution
effect is stronger (weaker) than the income effect when γ < (>)1, leading to more (less)
aggressive management of the exhaustible resource as compared to the risk-free case.
When γ = 1, the risk of symmetric shock does not change the optimal extraction from
the risk-free level.
However, this is not true if the shock is asymmetric and only affects a portion of the
entire exhaustible resource stock. When the shock is asymmetric, we show that optimal
management requires a sequential extraction plan that first exhausts the stock under
the threat of shock. We used a two-period deterministic model with a shock occurring in
the second period to show how the optimal extraction differs with an asymmetric shock
compared to a symmetric shock. We also found that the optimal extraction changes
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non-monotonically in the share of the stock that is under the threat of the shock. This is
because the relative magnitude of the substitution effect and the income effect changes
with the share of stock exposed to risk.
We extended the two-period deterministic model into an infinite horizon stochastic
model where the occurrence of the shock is determined by a constant hazard rate.
We showed that the non-monotonic change of optimal extraction in the share of stock
exposed to risk extends naturally into the infinite horizon model, and used this result to
discuss the corresponding transition path. We showed that with a potential asymmetric
shock, the optimal extraction is higher than the risk-free case initially, leading to faster
decline of the resource stock. However, when the risky stock is exhausted and transition
path enters the risk-free phase, the resource stock and optimal extraction are lower than
the case where the risk of asymmetric shock does not exist in the beginning.
We acknowledge that the models in this paper have very simple structure and ne-
glect several interesting real world complications. Firstly, we ignored growth of natural
resources. Our benchmark result on the symmetric shock is a simplified version of Ren
and Polasky [48] who studied the optimal management of a renewable resource. Fu-
ture research could include generalizing our result on the asymmetric shock to study its
effect on the renewable resource management. In addition, we simplified the shock to
be a single-time proportional stock effect. There are more complicated risk structures
including time-varying risks and multiple potential shocks. Finally, we focused on the
effect of potential shock on optimal management rather than the equilibrium in decen-
tralized market. It would be especially interesting to see if and how the existence of
symmetric and asymmetric shocks would change market equilibrium extraction.
3.6 Technical proof
Derivation of maximization problem (3.8). Suppose the resource manager extracts
cs from ks and cn from kn. The the maximization problem is
max
cs, cn
{u(cs + cn) + βu[x(ks − cs) + (kn − cn)]} (3.22)
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subject to 0 ≤ cs ≤ ks and 0 ≤ cn ≤ kn. The optimal solution must satisfy following
first order conditions
u′(cs + cn) + ps = βxu′[x(ks − cs) + (kn − cn)] + qs (3.23)
u′(cs + cn) + pn = βu′[x(ks − cs) + (kn − cn)] + qn (3.24)
and the following feasibility and complementary slackness conditions
cs ≥ 0 csps = 0 ps ≥ 0 (3.25)
cn ≥ 0 cnpn = 0 pn ≥ 0 (3.26)
cs ≤ ks (ks − cs)qs = 0 qs ≥ 0 (3.27)
cn ≤ kn (kn − cn)qn = 0 qn ≥ 0. (3.28)
Notice that (3.23) and (3.24) implies that
ps − qs < pn − qn. (3.29)
We consider three cases: cs = 0, 0 < cs < ks and cs = ks.
If cs = 0, (3.27) implies qs = 0. According to (3.29) we know pn > qn ≥ 0. Then
(3.26) implies cn = 0 and (3.28) implies qn = 0. This is impossible because both (3.23)
and (3.24) are violated when cs = 0 and cn = 0. So we must have cs > 0.
If 0 < cs < ks, (3.25) implies ps = 0 and (3.27) implies qs = 0. According to (3.29)
we know pn > qn ≥ 0. Then (3.26) implies cn = 0.
If cs = ks, (3.25) implies ps = 0. Notice that in this case it is impossible that
cn = kn. Otherwise (3.26) implies pn = 0 and both (3.23) and (3.24) are violated. Then
it is must true that cn < kn and (3.28) implies qn = 0. Thus pn > −qs by (3.29) and in
this case (3.26) implies both cn = 0 and cn > 0 are possible.
In sum, define c = cs + cn, the first case implies c > 0; the second case implies kn is
not extracted (cn = 0) if c < ks; and the third case implies kn is possible to be extracted
(cn ≥ 0) if ks is exhausted (cs = ks). Applying these results to (3.22) we find that the
resource manager’s problem is equivalent to (3.8).
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Proof of Proposition 6. Given the extraction rate c, if the shock does not occur in
an infinitesimally short period ∆t, the total resource stock becomes k − ∆tc and the
share of risky stock becomes (ks −∆tc)/(k −∆tc) = (τk −∆tc)/(k −∆tc). However,
if the shock occurs before ∆t, the total stock is xks + kn = xτk + (1 − τ)k. Then the
resource manager solves
W (k, τ) = e−λ∆t max
c
{
∆tu(c) + e−ρ∆tW
(
k −∆tc, τk −∆tc
k −∆tc
)}
+ (1− e−λ∆t)V [(xτ + 1− τ)k].
In the limiting case ∆t→ 0 we have
(ρ+ λ)W (k, τ) = max
c
{
u(c)−
[
Wk(k, τ) +
(1− τ)
k
Wτ (k, τ)
]
c
}
+ λV [(xτ + 1− τ)k]. (3.30)
This is equivalent to resource manager’s problem (3.18).
We use the log utility function, and make a guess that
W (k, τ) = A log[g(τ)k] +B. (3.31)
Then the first order condition is
1
cAS
=
A
k
[
1 + (1− τ)g
′(τ)
g(τ)
]
. (3.32)
Substituting into (3.30) we can solve that
(ρ+ λ)A log k + (ρ+ λ)A log g(τ) + (ρ+ λ)B
= log k − logA− log
[
1 + (1− τ)g
′(τ)
g(τ)
]
− 1
+
λ
ρ
log k +
λ
ρ
log(xτ + 1− τ) + λ(log ρ− 1)
ρ
.
The right hand side uses the fact that when γ = 1 the risk-free value function V (k) in
the form of (3.13) reduces to
V (k) =
1
ρ
log k +
log ρ− 1
ρ
.
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Then the method of undetermined coefficient implies that A = 1/ρ, B = (log ρ − 1)/ρ
and
ρ+ λ
ρ
log g(τ) = − log
[
1 + (1− τ)g
′(τ)
g(τ)
]
+
λ
ρ
log(xτ + 1− τ).
This yields the following differential equation
g(τ)1+λ/ρ + (1− τ)g′(τ)g(τ)λ/ρ = (xτ + 1− τ)λ/ρ.
Standard solution methods yield
g(τ) =
[
1
x
(xτ + 1− τ)1+λ/ρ + C(1− τ)1+λ/ρ
]ρ/(ρ+λ)
where C is a constant. We set g(0) = 1 so W (k, 0) = V (k). In other words, the value
function is in the risk-free form when the share of risky stock is 0. Then C = 1 − 1/x
and
g(τ) =
[
(xτ + 1− τ)1+λ/ρ − (1− x)(1− τ)1+λ/ρ
x
]ρ/(ρ+λ)
(3.33)
Then Equation (3.19) follows from substituting (3.33) into (3.32) and Equation (3.20)
follows from substituting (3.33) into (3.31).
Chapter 4
Cournot competition in an
exhaustible resource market with
potential shocks to resource
stocks
4.1 Introduction
In imperfectly competitive exhaustible resource markets, competitors may bear hetero-
geneous risks. Environmental conditions vary by location subjecting different resource
stocks to different risks. For example, oil extraction could be affected by very different
environmental disturbances in the Gulf of Mexico, Eastern Siberia or the Middle East.
Resource markets are also affected by social and political conditions that are different
across resource extraction countries. Extractors in countries where expropriation of pri-
vate stocks is imminent [26, 32, 34] face additional risk as compared to extractors in
countries where private property rights are well established and protected. Furthermore,
technological innovation could also have unbalanced effect on the economic values of in
situ stocks between the innovating country and countries without the new technology
[11, 12, 14]. This paper considers a simple version of risk heterogeneity. The risk in
our model is from a potential shock that causes a reduction in an exhaustible resource
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stock. We introduce heterogeneity by assuming that this shock could affect different
competitors’ stocks asymmetrically.
Following Weinstein and Zeckhauser [66], Stiglitz [59], Dasgupta and Heal [13] and
Eswaran and Lewis [17], we study a Cournot duopoly model where each Cournot player
owns a private resource stock.1 Similar to Stiglitz [59], Cournot competition in our
model does not distort the Pareto optimal level of extraction in the risk-free environment
when demand is derived from isoelastic preferences and extraction cost is zero. Cournot
players, unlike price takers, have some market power and make their extraction decisions
based on quantity dependent marginal revenue instead of the exogenously given price.
With isoelastic demand and zero extraction cost, marginal revenue is proportional to
price and the proportion only depends on the constant demand elasticity. Therefore,
in dynamic equilibrium the distortion effect of market power cancels out and Cournot
equilibrium coincides with the Pareto optimal outcome.
When the risk of shock is introduced, our model shows that the coincidence between
Cournot equilibrium and Pareto optimal solution still holds if both Cournot players’
stocks are all affected by the shock, i.e., symmetric shock in our model. However,
when the risk of shock is asymmetrically allocated on the stocks of the two Cournot
players, aggregate extraction in equilibrium will generally differ from the Pareto optimal
outcome. We find that strategic behaviors could increase or decrease the extraction in
Cournot equilibrium as compared to the Pareto optimal level, depending on the relative
size of the two players’ stocks and the share of resource stock that is under the risk of
shock.
With an asymmetric shock, Cournot competition can cause distortions that leads
to persistent impacts on the transition path of extraction and remaining stock with
resulting losses in social welfare. In the risk-free case and the case with symmetric
shock, welfare loss is zero because the Pareto optimal extraction is achieved in Cournot
equilibrium. However, when the potential shock only affects a portion of one player’s
stock and has no effect on the stock of the other player, welfare losses increase as the
share of the stock subject to risk increases. In our model the risky stock is extracted
first2 and exhausted in limited time. Because the first player takes a longer time to
1 Thus our model is different from the common property games such as Khalatbari [30], Levhari
and Mirman [31], Sinn [57], Reinganum and Stokey [46], Van der Ploeg [62], and others.
2 This result occurs because only risk heterogeneity exists in our model. Slade [58] and Gaudet and
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exhaust risky stock when its share is larger, there is a larger effect on the transition path
which leads to higher welfare losses. The largest welfare loss occurs in the completely
asymmetric risk case where the shock affects the entire stock of the first player and has
no impact on the second player’s stock. This result occurs because the risky stock will
never be exhausted by the first player and thus the whole transition path is under the
risk of asymmetric shock with consequent distortions. When the risk of shock is further
spread out to affect a portion of the second player’s stock (and the first player’s entire
stock), welfare loss starts to decrease as the share of risky stock of the second player
increases. This result occurs because in our example the distortion on extraction is
very small when the second player has a large share of risky stock. Thus the distortion
on transition path is small over prolonged time until the second player significantly
reduces the share of risky stock when the distortion on extraction becomes large. This
leads to lower welfare loss because the larger distortion in the further future is heavily
discounted. When the second player initially has a relatively small share of risky stock,
the distortion is much larger for the entire transition path, leading to larger welfare
losses. In the extreme case where both players’ stocks are completely affected by the
risk, welfare loss reduces to zero as is the case with a symmetric shock.
We analyze the Cournot model using a continuous time dynamic programming
framework. Thus this paper is among the literature of exhaustible resource oligopolistic
models with time consistent subgame perfect equilibria.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we build intuition
using a simple two-period model with deterministic shock that occurs in the second
period. In Section 4.3 we extend the model into an infinite horizon continuous time
stochastic model. We introduce stochasticity by assuming that the shock occurs poten-
tially with constant hazard rate after the the initial time. We will see that results in
the deterministic two-period model extend naturally into the infinite horizon stochastic
model. We discuss the long-term impact of the risk of shock on transition path and
social welfare in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes. All technical proofs are in Section
4.6.
Lasserre [19] showed that with both risk heterogeneity and cost heterogeneity, the order of extracting
multiple resource stocks depends on the trade-off between risk aversion and cost minimization.
3 More discussion of the methodologies and equilibrium concepts in resources models can be found
in Eswaran and Lewis [17], Van Long et al. [63] and Gaudet [18] .
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4.2 Two-period model with deterministic shock
We now consider a two-period Cournot model with two players. Suppose a representa-
tive consumer has the following utility function
u(c) =
c1−γ − 1
1− γ . (4.1)
Given this utility function, the demand function has the following form
p = c−γ = (c1 + c2)−γ ,
where p is the price, c is the aggregate quantity and c1 and c2 are individual extraction
strategies of the two Cournot players. We assume that γ ∈ (0, 1]. In other words, the
demand for exhaustible resource has at least unitary elasticity (1/γ ≥ 1).4
We consider the case where each player i = 1, 2 owns a private exhaustible resource
stock ki and pays no cost in extracting it. Player i maximizes total revenue over two
periods by choosing the amount of extraction ci in the first period, taking the strategy
of the other player j 6= i (cj) as given. In the second period, a shock would occur
deterministically, thus affects each player’s equilibrium strategy in the first period. In
the following we discuss the case with a symmetric shock and an asymmetric shock
separately.
4.2.1 Symmetric shock
With a symmetric shock, we assume that in the second period the shock reduces the
leftover of each player i’s stock ki − ci to x(ki − ci) where x ∈ [0, 1]. Then player i who
takes cj as given solves the following problem
max
ci
{
ci
(ci + cj)γ
+ β
x(ki − ci)
[x(ki − ci) + x(kj − cj)]γ
}
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. Under the assumption that γ ≤ 1, both terms
in the object function are strictly concave in the choice variable ci.
4 The elasticity of long-run demand for exhaustible resource such as oil could be high as with
technological that makes the exhaustible resource become more economically available. See Hamilton
[23] for more discussion.
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The first order conditions of two players are
Player 1
(1− γ)c1 + c2
(c1 + c2)γ+1
= βx1−γ
(1− γ)(k1 − c1) + k2 − c2
(k1 − c1 + k2 − c2)γ+1 (4.2)
Player 2
c1 + (1− γ)c2
(c1 + c2)γ+1
= βx1−γ
k1 − c1 + (1− γ)(k2 − c2)
(k1 − c1 + k2 − c2)γ+1 . (4.3)
Adding (4.2) and (4.3) we find
(2− γ)(c1 + c2)−γ = (2− γ)βx1−γ(k1 − c1 + k2 − c2)−γ . (4.4)
Because (4.2) and (4.3) imply that c1/k1 = c2/k2, for each player i the following is true
(2− γ)c−γi = (2− γ)βx1−γ(ki − ci)−γ . (4.5)
Thus, although each player i’s strategy is the best response to the competitor’s extrac-
tion behavior, it is independent of the competitor’s resource stock.
Equilibrium extraction
From (4.5) we can solve player i’s equilibrium extraction
cˆSSi =
ki
1 + β1/γx1/γ−1
(4.6)
where “SS” denotes “symmetric shock” and the hat denotes Cournot equilibrium. Adding
across i = 1, 2 we find the aggregate extraction in Cournot equilibrium is
cˆSS =
k
1 + β1/γx1/γ−1
(4.7)
where cˆSS = cˆSS1 + cˆ
SS
2 and k = k1 + k2. If there is no shock, or x = 1, (4.6) and (4.7)
become
cˆNSi =
ki
1 + β1/γ
(4.8)
and
cˆNS =
k
1 + β1/γ
(4.9)
where “NS” denotes “no shock”, and similar as before, cˆNS = cˆNS1 + cˆ
NS
2 .
Comparing (4.6) and (4.8) we find
cˆSSi ≥ cˆNSi ⇔ γ ≤ 1 for i = 1, 2, (4.10)
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and by (4.7) and (4.9)
cˆSS ≥ cˆNS ⇔ γ ≤ 1. (4.11)
The second period shock has competing effects through quantity and price. It reduces
the second period sales of each player, but also increases the market price due to lower
aggregate supply. According to (4.10) and (4.11), when γ < 1, the threat of symmetric
shock encourages both players to increase the extraction in the first period, leading
to higher aggregate extraction. This result occurs because, by (4.2) and (4.3), the
symmetric shock lowers the marginal revenue of both player in the second period when
γ < 1. In this case, sales decrease more than price rises in the second period. Thus
each Cournot player can increase total revenue by shifting extraction from the second
period to the first period. However, when γ = 1, the quantity effect and price effect
fully offset each other and symmetric shock has no impact on equilibrium extraction at
either individual level or aggregate level.
Social welfare
Given aggregate resource stock k = k1 + k2, the social welfare is measured by the net
present value of representative consumer’s utility over two periods and maximized as
the following
max
c
{u(c) + βu[x(k − c)]}. (4.12)
The first order condition to this problem is
c−γ = βx1−γ(k − c)−γ . (4.13)
This yields the Pareto optimal extraction
cSS =
k
1 + β1/γx1/γ−1
. (4.14)
When there is no shock, or x = 1, the Pareto optimal extraction becomes
cNS =
k
1 + β1/γ
. (4.15)
Note that the Pareto optimal extraction rates given by (4.14) and (4.15) are not
different from the aggregate extractions in Cournot equilibrium given by (4.7) and (4.9).
As pointed out by Stiglitz [59], with isoelastic market demand and zero extraction
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cost, monopolistic power has no distorting impact on the Pareto optimal extraction
plan because the monopolist’s marginal revenue is proportional to the market price
(marginal utility) and the proportion is constant over time. So the distortion between
marginal revenue and market price within each period cancels out across periods. This
result is also true in the Cournot duopolistic model. The aggregate marginal revenue of
Cournot competitors, captured by (4.4), is proportional to the representative consumer’s
marginal utility in (4.13), and the proportion is 2− γ in both periods.
Because there is no distortion in the quantity of aggregate extraction, Cournot
competition causes no welfare loss with symmetric shock or without shock. However,
with an asymmetric shock, Cournot competition will distort the Pareto optimal solution
in many cases, as illustrated in the following examples.
4.2.2 Asymmetric shock
When the shock is asymmetric, we assume that it only affects a certain part of the
entire resource stock. We consider two examples. In the first example, the shock affects
a portion of player 1’s stock and has no impact on player 2’s stock. In the second
example, the shock affects all of player 1’s stock and a portion of player 2’s stock.
Example 1
We assume that player 1’s stock k1 is comprised of two parts, k
s
1 and k
n
1 . In the second
period, the shock reduces the leftover of ks1 if it is still available and has no impact
on the leftover of kn1 . We also assume that the shock does not affect the leftover of
player 2’s stock k2 in the second period. Player 1 would not extract k
n
1 as long as k
s
1 is
available. This occurs because extractions from ks1 and k
n
1 are perfect substitutes and
extracting ks1 before k
n
1 leads to smaller resource stock that is under the threat of shock.
A proof of this argument is similar to Section 2.1 of Ren and Polasky [47]. Thus, if ks1
is not exhausted in the first period, in the second period the total stock of player 1 is
x(ks1 − c1) + kn1 . If ks1 is exhausted and kn1 is extracted in the first period, player 1 has
ks1 + k
n
1 − c1 = k1 − c1 in the second period.
To simplify the analysis we set γ = 1, then player 1 solves the following problem to
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maximize the total revenue over two periods
max
c1
 c1c1 + c2 + β

x(ks1 − c1) + kn1
x(ks1 − c1) + kn1 + k2 − c2
c1 < k
s
1
k1 − c1
k1 − c1 + k2 − c2 c1 ≥ k
s
1
 , (4.16)
and the similar problem for player 2 is
max
c2
 c2c1 + c2 + β

k2 − c2
x(ks1 − c1) + kn1 + k2 − c2
c1 < k
s
1
k2 − c2
k1 − c1 + k2 − c2 c1 ≥ k
s
1
 . (4.17)
Let
τ1 = k
s
1/k1 and θ1 = 1− τ1 + xτ1. (4.18)
We can solve for the Cournot equilibrium (cˆAS1 , cˆ
AS
2 ), where “AS” denotes “asymmetric
shock”, which depends on (k1, τ1, k2)
(cˆAS1 , cˆ
AS
2 ) =
(
k1
1 + β
,
k2
1 + β
)
τ1 ∈
[
0,
1
1 + β
)
(
τ1k1,
k1 + k2
1 +
√
β (1/τ1 − 1)
− τ1k1
)
τ1 ∈
[
1
1 + β
, τ1
)
 θ1k1
x+ β
(
θ1k1 + xk2
θ1k1 + k2
)2 , xk2
x+ β
(
θ1k1 + xk2
θ1k1 + k2
)2
 τ1 ∈ [τ1, 1]
(4.19)
where τ1 is determined by
τ1
1− τ1
(
1− τ1 + xτ1 + xk2/k1
1− τ1 + xτ1 + k2/k1
)2
=
1
β
.
It can be verified that 1/(1 + β) < τ1 < 1. We will discuss this solution after solving
the second example.
Example 2
In this example the allocation of the shock affects the entire stock of the first player,
k1, and a part of the stock of the second player, k2. Specifically, we assume that k2 is
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comprised of two parts, ks2 and k
n
2 . In the second period, the shock reduces the leftover
of ks2 if it is still available and has no impact on the leftover of k
n
2 . Thus, if k
s
2 is
not exhausted in the first period, the total stock of player 2 is x(ks2 − c2) + kn2 in the
second period. If ks2 is exhausted and k
n
2 is extracted in the first period, player 2 has
ks2 + k
n
2 − c2 = k2 − c2 in the second period. We also assume that the shock will reduce
the leftover of player 1’s stock k1.
In this example player 1 solves
max
c1

c1
c1 + c2
+ β

x(k1 − c1)
x(k1 − c1) + x(ks2 − c2) + kn2
c2 < k
s
2
x(k1 − c1)
x(k1 − c1) + k2 − c2 c2 ≥ k
s
2
 , (4.20)
and player 2 solves
max
c2

c2
c1 + c2
+ β

x(ks2 − c2) + kn2
x(k1 − c1) + x(ks2 − c2) + kn2
c2 < k
s
2
k2 − c2
x(k1 − c1) + k2 − c2 c2 ≥ k
s
2
 . (4.21)
Let
τ2 = k
s
2/k2 and θ2 = 1− τ2 + xτ2, (4.22)
we solve for Cournot equilibrium (cˆAS1 , cˆ
AS
2 ), which depends on (k1, k2, τ2)
(cˆAS1 , cˆ
AS
2 ) =
 k1
1 + βx
(
k1 + k2
xk1 + k2
)2 , k2
1 + βx
(
k1 + k2
xk1 + k2
)2
 τ2 ∈
0, 1
1 + βx
(
k1 + k2
xk1 + k2
)2

(
xk1 + θ2k2
x+
√
βx (1/τ2 − 1)
− τ2k2, τ2k2
)
τ2 ∈
 1
1 + βx
(
k1 + k2
xk1 + k2
)2 , 11 + βx
(
k1
1 + β
,
θ2k2
x(1 + β)
)
τ2 ∈
[
1
1 + βx
, 1
]
(4.23)
74
Distortion in extraction
Cournot equilibria with an asymmetric shock (4.19) and (4.23) distort the Pareto opti-
mal extraction that maximizes the representative consumer’s total utility in two periods.
As discussed by Ren and Polasky [47], when γ = 1, the Pareto optimal extraction plan
solves
max
c
log c+ β
log[x(ks − c) + kn] c < kslog(ks + kn − c) c ≥ ks
 . (4.24)
where ks = ks1 in the first example, k
s = k1 + k
s
2 in the second example and k
n =
k1 + k2 − ks = k − ks. Then the Pareto optimal extraction is
cAS =

k
1 + β
τ ∈
[
0,
1
1 + β
)
τk τ ∈
[
1
1 + β
,
1
1 + βx
)
θk
x(1 + β)
τ ∈
[
1
1 + βx
, 1
] (4.25)
where
τ = ks/k and θ = 1− τ + xτ. (4.26)
The Pareto optimal extraction follows a sequential plan where ks is extracted before kn
because a planner would like to reduce the size of the resource stock that will be affected
by the shock in the second period. When τ < 1/(1 + β), optimal extraction is larger
than ks and is not affected by the shock. This is the interior solution of the second
case of (4.24). When 1/(1 + β) ≤ τ < 1/(1 + βx), it is optimal to exhaust ks exactly.
This is the corner solution of the second case of (4.24) where the optimal extraction
is constrained by the shock. When τ > 1/(1 + βx), exhausting ks becomes inefficient.
This is the first case of (4.24) where the shock will occur in the second period because
the leftover of ks is positive. Figure 4.1 shows how the quantity of Pareto optimal
extraction (4.25) is distorted in the two examples of Cournot competition given k = 1,
β = 0.98 and x = 0.3.5
5 These parameter values are used throughout this paper. The following qualitative results are
robust with variation in these parameter values.
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The Cournot equilibrium strategies of two players are plotted in the top and middle
panels of Figure 4.1 against ks1. The left, middle and right panels of Figure 4.1 show
results for k1/k2 = 1/2, 1, 2, respectively. The aggregate extraction in Cournot equilib-
rium is plotted in the bottom panel as a solid line. The dashed line in the bottom panel
is the Pareto optimal extraction given by (4.25), which is independent of the value of
k1/k2.
According to (4.19), when τ1 = k
s
1/k1 < 1/(1 + β), k
s
1 is smaller than player 1’s
equilibrium extraction k1/(1 + β) and is exhausted in the first period. In this case the
shock has no impact on Cournot equilibrium. The top and middle panels of Figure
4.1 show that equilibrium strategies of both players do not change as the size of ks1
increases. In the bottom chart of each panel we also see that the aggregate extraction
in Cournot equilibrium (solid line) equals to the Pareto optimal solution (dashed line).
This is consistent with (4.9) and (4.15) that market power has no distorting effect when
the shock does not affect the Cournot equilibrium.
When 1/(1 + β) ≤ τ1 < τ1, (4.19) shows that player 1’s strategy is binding at
ks1 = τ1k1. This result is the corner solution of the second case of player 1’s problem
(4.16). In this case player 1 would like to exhaust ks1 in the first period in order to
avoid the shock in the second period. Given player 1’s strategy, player 2’s best response
function, solved from the second case of (4.17), is plotted as dashed lines in the top chart
of Figure 4.2 for k1/k2 = 1/2, 1 or 2. The solid part of each dashed line is corresponding
to the second case of (4.19) where player 1’s strategy is binding at ks1. We see that when
k1 is relatively small as compared to k2 (k1/k2 = 1/2 or 1), it is optimal for player 2
to extract more in response to player 1’s binding strategy which is increasing in ks1.
However, when k1 is relatively large (k1/k2 = 2), player 2’s best response is to extract
less when player 1 increases extraction.6 These results are consistent with the top
and middle panels in Figure 4.1.
6 In our model where the demand function has constant unitary elasticity, the best response function
is non-monotonic and the slope depends on the relative size of the competitors. This is different from
the result when the demand function is concave, or at least not “too” convex, as discussed by Varian
[64]. With a linear demand, i.e., p = q − c1 − c2, the best response function is always decreasing.
77
Figure 4.2: Best response to the competitor’s binding behavior in the two-period model
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The bottom panels of Figure 4.1 show that Cournot competition begins to distort the
Pareto optimal solution when player 1’s strategy is binding. By (4.19) the aggregate
extraction in Cournot equilibrium starts to increase when τ1 becomes greater than
1/(1 +β), but by the first case of (4.25) the Pareto optimal extraction is still constant.7
Note that besides the distortion in quantity, there is also the distortion in the order of
extracting different types of stocks. In the Pareto optimal solution, k2 is not extracted
as long as ks1 is still available. However, in the Cournot model, player 2’s extraction
from k2 is simultaneous with player 1’s extraction from k
s
1.
When τ1 ≥ τ1, ks1 is sufficiently large that in Cournot equilibrium it is not exhausted
by player 1 in the first period (if the condition is satisfied strictly). In this case the shock
would occur in the second period. Using (4.18) and (4.19) we can show that given k1
and k2, cˆ
AS
1 is decreasing in k
s
1 and cˆ
AS
2 is increasing in k
s
1. At the aggregate level,
cˆAS1 + cˆ
AS
2 is decreasing in k
s
1 and the Pareto optimal solution is distorted. Figure 4.1
shows that the aggregate extraction in Cournot equilibrium could be either higher or
lower as compared to the Pareto optimal solution, depending on the value of ks1/k1 and
k1/k2.
For the second example, as shown by (4.23), when τ2 = k
s
2/k2 < 1/(1 + βx(k1 +
k2)
2/(xk1 + k2)
2), player 2’s equilibrium extraction in the first period is larger than
ks2, thus the shock only affects player 1’s stock in the second period. In this case the
equilibrium strategies of both players do not change as the size of ks2 increases. Because
player 2 extracts positive amounts from kn2 which is not affected by the shock, while
player 1 only extract a portion of k1 that is under the threat of the shock, the Pareto
optimal sequential extraction plan is distorted. The Pareto optimal quantity is also
distorted as shown in the bottom charts of Figure 4.1, and we can see that the direction
of the distortion depends on the value of ks2/k2 and k1/k2.
As τ2 increases, player 2’s strategy is binding at k
s
2 = τ2k2 when 1/(1 + βx(k1 +
k2)
2/(xk1 + k2)
2) ≤ τ2 < 1/(1 + βx). This is the corner solution of the second case of
player 2’s problem (4.21). Player 1’s best response function solved from the second case
of (4.20) is plotted as dashed lines in the bottom chart of Figure 4.2 for k1/k2 = 1/2,
1 or 2, and the solid part of each dashed line is corresponding to player 2’s binding
7 By (4.18) and (4.26), τ = k1τ1/(k1 + k2). We can verify that when τ1 = 1/(1 + β), the condition
for the first case of (4.25), τ < 1/(1 + β), is still satisfied.
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strategy. When k2 is relatively large as compared to k1 (k1/k2 = 1/2 or 1), player 1
would extract less in respond to player 2’s binding strategy which is increasing in ks2.
However, when k2 is relatively small (k1/k2 = 2), it is optimal for player 1 to extract
more as player 2’s extraction increases. These results are consistent with the top and
middle panels in Figure 4.1. As shown by the bottom panels of Figure 4.1, the aggregate
extraction in Cournot equilibrium distorts the Pareto optimal solution.
When τ2 ≥ 1/(1 + βx), ks2 is sufficiently large and in equilibrium player 2 would
not exhaust ks2 in the first period (if the condition is satisfied strictly). In the second
period, the shock will affect the leftovers of k1 and k
s
2. According to (4.22) and (4.23),
given k1 and k2, player 2’s equilibrium extraction cˆ
AS
2 is decreasing in k
s
2 and player
1’s equilibrium extraction cˆAS1 is constant. It is interesting to note that the aggregate
extraction cˆAS1 + cˆ
AS
2 in this case is the same as the Pareto optimal solution. This is
shown in Figure 4.1 and can be verified by comparing (4.23) with (4.25).8
The solutions of the two examples, as plotted in Figure 4.1, show that the Pareto
optimal extraction is distorted when τ1 > 1/(1 + β) and τ2 < 1/(1 + βx). According to
(4.18), (4.22) and (4.26), this is equivalent to
k1
(1 + β)(k1 + k2)
< τ <
k1 + k2/(1 + βx)
k1 + k2
. (4.27)
Depending on the values of τ and k1/k2, aggregate extraction in Cournot equilibrium
could be either higher or lower as compared to the Pareto optimal quantity.
Welfare loss
We have seen that Pareto optimal extraction is distorted when (4.27) is true. We now
discuss the loss in social welfare caused by the distortion. Substituting (4.25) into (4.24)
we can solve for the maximized welfare in the Pareto optimal case
Π =

(1 + β) log k + log
ββ
(1 + β)1+β
τ ∈
[
0,
1
1 + β
)
(1 + β) log k + log[τ(1− τ)β] τ ∈
[
1
1 + β
,
1
1 + βx
)
(1 + β) log k + log
θ1+βββ
x(1 + β)1+β
τ ∈
[
1
1 + βx
, 1
] . (4.28)
8 By (4.22) and (4.26), τ = (k1 + k2τ2)/(k1 + k2). We can verify that the condition for the third
case of (4.25), τ < 1/(1 + βx), is satisfied when τ2 = 1/(1 + βx).
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For the Cournot equilibria in the two examples, the welfare is measured as follows
Πˆ = log(cˆAS1 + cˆ
AS
2 ) + β

log(ks1 + k
n
1 − cˆAS1 + k2 − cˆAS2 ) ks1 ≤ cˆAS1
log[x(ks1 − cˆAS1 ) + kn1 + k2 − cˆAS2 ] ks1 > cˆAS1
log[x(k1 − cˆAS1 ) + ks2 + kn2 − cˆAS2 ] ks2 ≤ cˆAS2
log[x(k1 − cˆAS1 ) + x(ks2 − cˆAS2 ) + kn2 ] ks2 > cˆAS2
.
Then by (4.19) the welfare corresponding to the first example is
Πˆ =
(1 + β) log(k1 + k2) + log
ββ
(1 + β)1+β
τ1 ∈
[
0,
1
1 + β
)
(1 + β) log(k1 + k2) + log
√
β(1/τ1 − 1)β
(1 +
√
β(1/τ1 − 1))1+β
τ1 ∈
[
1
1 + β
, τ1
)
(1 + β) log(θ1k1 + xk2) + log
ββ
(
θ1k1 + xk2
θ1k1 + k2
)β
[
x+ β
(
θ1k1 + xk2
θ1k1 + k2
)2]1+β τ1 ∈ [τ1, 1]
(4.29)
and using (4.23) the welfare corresponding to the second example is
Πˆ =
(1 + β) log(k1 + k2) + log
ββxβ
(
k1 + k2
xk1 + k2
)β
[
1 + βx
(
k1 + k2
xk1 + k2
)2]1+β τ2 ∈
0, 1
1 + βx
(
k1 + k2
xk1 + k2
)2

(1 + β) log(xk1 + θ2k2) + log
√
βx(1/τ2 − 1)β
(x+
√
βx(1/τ2 − 1))1+β
τ2 ∈
 1
1 + βx
(
k1 + k2
xk1 + k2
)2 , 11 + βx

(1 + β) log(xk1 + θ2k2) + log
ββ
x(1 + β)1+β
τ2 ∈
[
1
1 + βx
, 1
]
(4.30)
Figure 4.3 compares Π, the maximized social welfare from the Pareto optimal solu-
tion given by (4.28), with Πˆ, the social welfare from the Cournot equilibrium given by
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(4.29) and (4.30), for k1/k2 = 1/2, 1 or 2. The social welfare from the Pareto optimal
extraction, plotted by the dashed lines, is independent of k1/k2 ans is thus the same
in all three panels of Figure 4.3. We can see that the Pareto welfare is constant when
τ < 1/(1 + β) because the optimal extraction involves extracting all stock exposed to
shock in the first period. When τ becomes larger, optimal extraction is affected by the
shock and the Pareto welfare starts to decrease as τ rises.
The welfare from Cournot equilibrium is plotted by the solid lines in Figure 4.3.
The welfare loss, or the difference between the Pareto welfare and Cournot welfare, is
shown by the shaded areas. We can see that Cournot competition causes welfare loss.
When τ is sufficiently small such that τ1 < 1/(1 +β) is satisfied, comparing (4.29) with
(4.28) we can see that Cournot competition causes no welfare loss in the first example.
When τ is sufficiently large such that τ2 > 1/(1 + βx) is satisfied, comparing (4.30)
with (4.28) we also see that Cournot competition causes no welfare loss in the second
example. These extreme cases are consistent with Figure 4.1. However, between these
two extreme cases Cournot competition will distort the aggregate extraction and leads
to a loss in social welfare.
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Figure 4.3: Welfare loss in the two-period model
k1/k2 = 1/2
k1/k2 = 1
k1/k2 = 2
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In the first example, when τ1 ≥ 1/(1 + β), player 1’s equilibrium extraction is
constrained by the the shock, leading to distortion in aggregate extraction. Figure 4.3
shows that the welfare from Cournot equilibrium starts to decrease in τ1. However, the
welfare in the Pareto optimal solution is still constant because the optimal extraction
is not constrained by the shock because τ < 1/(1 + β). Therefore, welfare loss starts to
increase in τ1. The welfare loss reaches maximum when τ1 = 1. As the shock is further
spread out to affect player 2’s stock, Cournot competition becomes the case in the
second example. In the second example, welfare from Cournot equilibrium is constant
if τ2 < 1/(1 + βx(k1 + k2)
2/(xk1 + k2)
2). In this case player 2’s equilibrium extraction
is not constrained by the shock. Thus the welfare loss becomes smaller as the welfare
from the Pareto solution starts to decrease when the optimal extraction is constrained
by the shock. When τ2 rises to 1/(1 + βx), there is no distortion in extraction and the
welfare loss reduces to 0.
In this section we used a two-period model to analyze the impact of a shock on
Cournot equilibrium. We found that when the shock affects both Cournot players’
stocks symmetrically it does not change the first period equilibrium extraction when
demand has constant unitary elasticity.However, when the allocation of the shock is
asymmetric, we found that even with unitary elastic demand, Cournot equilibrium
changes with the relative size of the Cournot players’ stocks and the share of stock
that is under the threat of the shock. Also in Cournot equilibrium, both players will
extract stocks simultaneously, violating the Pareto optimal sequential plan that requires
extracting the threatened stock first. Besides the distortion in the order of extracting
different types of stocks, the quantity of extraction is also distorted in many cases. We
showed that the distortion in quantity and welfare loss depend on the relative sizes of
the Cournot players’ stocks and the share of threatened stock. In the next section we
will examine these results in an infinite horizon model where the occurrence of the shock
is stochastic.
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4.3 Infinite horizon model with stochastic shock
In the infinite horizon model each player i = 1, 2 owns initial stock ki. Within a
continuous-time risk-free framework player i solves the following problem
Vˆ i(k1, k2) = max
ci
{
∆t
ci
(c1 + c2)γ
+ e−ρ∆tVˆ i(k1 −∆tc1, k2 −∆tc2)
}
taking the extraction strategy cj of the other player j 6= i as given. The continuous-time
discount factor is given as ρ = − log β. In the limiting case ∆t→ 0
ρVˆ i(k1, k2) = max
ci
{
ci
(c1 + c2)γ
− Vˆ ik1(k1, k2)c1 − Vˆ ik2(k1, k2)c2
}
.9 (4.31)
We can verify that the the equilibrium extraction of player i is
cˆNSi =
ρki
γ
(4.32)
and the corresponding value function of is
Vˆ i(k1, k2) =
(
γ
ρ
)γ ki
(k1 + k2)γ
. (4.33)
Because equilibrium strategies are solved using dynamic programming methods, the
solutions are time consistent and subgame perfect.
We now introduce a stochastic shock into the model. We assume that at any time
t ≥ 0, a shock occurs with constant hazard rate λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then the cumulative
probability of the shock occurring by t ≥ 0 is
Λ(t) = 1− e−λt. (4.34)
The shock only occurs once and the dynamic system enters the risk-free phase after the
occurrence. As the two-period model, we consider a symmetric shock and an asymmetric
shock separately. Our model has complete information so the hazard rate and allocation
of the shock is known to both players.
9 Throughout this paper we use subscript to denote the partial derivative to the corresponding
argument.
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4.3.1 Symmetric shock
The symmetric shock once it occurs will reduce both players’ stocks to a proportion x
of the size prior to the occurrence. Then under the threat of an symmetric shock, player
i takes the other player’s strategy cj as given and solves
Wˆ i(k1, k2) = e
−λ∆t max
ci
{
∆t
ci
(c1 + c2)γ
+ e−ρ∆tWˆ i(k1 −∆tc1, k2 −∆tc2)
}
+ (1− e−λ∆t)Vˆ i(xk1, xk2)
where Vˆ i is given by (4.31). In the limiting case ∆t→ 0
ρWˆ i(k1, k2) = max
ci
{
ci
(c1 + c2)γ
− Wˆ ik1(k1, k2)c1 − Wˆ ik2(k1, k2)c2
}
− λ[Wˆ i(k1, k2)− Vˆ i(xk1, xk2)]. (4.35)
Comparing (4.35) with the risk-free model (4.31), we see that the potential symmetric
shock causes a damage λ[Wˆ i(k1, k2)−Vˆ i(xk1, xk2)] on player i’s value function. Because
complete information is assumed in our model, dynamic programming method ensures
that the solution of (4.35), denoted by cˆSSi , is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Equilibrium extraction
The following result compares cˆSSi , solution of (4.35), with the risk-free Cournot equi-
librium cˆNSi given by (4.32).
Proposition 7. In the infinite horizon model, a potential symmetric shock affects the
Cournot equilibrium as follows
cˆSSi ≥ cˆNSi ⇔ γ ≤ 1 for i = 1, 2.
Same result also holds for cˆSS = cˆSS1 + cˆ
SS
2 and cˆ
NS = cˆNS1 + cˆ
NS
2 .
Proof. Assuming Wˆ i(k1, k2) = Aki/(k1 + k2)
γ , the first order condition of (4.35) is
c1 + c2 − γci
(c1 + c2)γ+1
= A
k1 + k2 − γki
(k1 + k2)γ+1
for i = 1, 2.
This implies that the equilibrium satisfies cˆSS1 /k1 = cˆ
SS
2 /k2 and
cˆSSi = A
−1/γki. (4.36)
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Then substituting (4.33), (4.36), and the assumed form of Wˆ i into (4.35) we find A is
determined as the following
(ρ+ λ)A = γA1−1/γ + λx1−γ(γ/ρ)γ . (4.37)
This implies (
γ
ρ
)γ
R A R x1−γ
(
γ
ρ
)γ
.
Because x < 1, the following is true
A
− 1
γ ≥ ρ
γ
⇔ γ ≤ 1.
Then the desired result at individual level follows by comparing (4.32) with (4.36) and
the desired result at aggregate level is straightforward.
Proposition 7 shows that the two-period results (4.10) and (4.11) extend naturally
to the infinite horizon model with a stochastic shock. The shock potentially reduces the
sales of both players, but also increases the market price due to lower aggregate supply.
When γ < 1 sales decrease more than price rises, leading to lower marginal revenue
that encourages both players to increase the extraction as compared to the risk-free
case. When γ = 1, two competing effects though quantity and price fully offset each
other and the potential symmetric shock has no impact on equilibrium extraction.
Social welfare
The social welfare is measured by the net present value of the representative consumer’s
utility flow to the infinite future. As discussed by Ren and Polasky [47], given aggregate
initial stock k = k1 + k2 the representative consumer solves
ρW (k) = max
c
{u(c)−W ′(k)c} − λ[W (k)− V (xk)], (4.38)
where V is the standard risk-free value function given by
ρV (k) = max
c
{u(c)− V ′(k)c}. (4.39)
The solution of (4.38) satisfies
cSS = A−1/γk (4.40)
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where A is determined exactly the same as in (4.37). In the risk-free case λ = 0, then
by (4.37), (4.40) reduces to the solution of (4.39)
cNS =
ρk
γ
. (4.41)
We have the following result.
Proposition 8. In the infinite horizon model, Cournot equilibrium does not distort the
Pareto optimal extraction and leads to no welfare loss when there is no shock or the
risk of shock is symmetric.
Proof. The desired result in the risk-free case follows from (4.32) and (4.41), and the
desired result with symmetric shock follows from (4.36) and (4.40).
Proposition 8 shows the coincidence between Cournot equilibria and Pareto optimal
solutions in the risk-free case and the case where the potential shock is symmetric.
In the Cournot model each player i’s marginal revenue [(1 − γ)ci + cj ](c1 + c2)−γ−1
is proportional to the representative consumer’s marginal utility (market price) p =
(c1 + c2)
−γ . The equilibrium strategy (4.32) and (4.36) show that each Cournot player
i extracts a constant fraction from ki, implying that the proportion 1− γci/(c1 + c2) =
1−γki/(k1 +k2) is constant over time. Therefore, similar to Stiglitz [59], the distortion
effect of Cournot competition at each single time point cancels out and there is no loss
in social welfare.
However, when the potential shock affects k1 and k2 asymmetrically, the coincidence
between Cournot equilibria and Pareto optimal solutions fails. In the following we will
extend the two examples discussed in the two-period model into infinite horizon to show
how an asymmetric stochastic shock changes the Cournot players’ strategies so that they
do not equal the Pareto optimal solutions.
4.3.2 Asymmetric shock
Example 1
As in the two period model, we first consider the case where player 1’s stock k1 comprises
two parts ks1 and k
n
1 and τ1 = k
s
1/k1. A potential shock only affects k
s
1 and has no impact
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on kn1 and player 2’s stock k2. Then given these state variables the value functions of
two players can be denoted by Wˆ 1(k1, k2, τ1) and Wˆ
2(k1, k2, τ1).
We now claim, and verify later, that given γ = 1, for any τ1 ∈ [0, 1], both Wˆ 1(k1, k2, τ1)
and Wˆ 2(k1, k2, τ1) are homogeneous of degree 0 in (k1, k2). Then define
φ = k1/k2, (4.42)
we know Wˆ 1(k1, k2, τ1) = Wˆ
1(φ, 1, τ1) and Wˆ
2(k1, k2, τ1) = Wˆ
2(φ, 1, τ1), so we only
need to use (φ, τ1) as state variables. Then let θ1 be defined as in (4.18), player i solves
Wˆ i(φ, τ1) = e
−λ∆t max
ci
{
∆t
ci
c1 + c2
+ e−ρ∆tWˆ i
(
k1 −∆tc1
k2 −∆tc2 ,
τ1k1 −∆tc1
k1 −∆tc1
)}
+ (1− e−λ∆t)Vˆ i(θ1k1, k2)
where Vˆ i is given by (4.31). In the limiting case ∆t→ 0 we have
ρWˆ i(φ, τ1) = max
ci
{
ci
c1 + c2
−
[
φWˆ iφ + (1− τ1)Wˆ iτ1
] c1
k1
+ φWˆ iφ
c2
k2
}
− λ[Wˆ i(φ, τ1)− Vˆ i(θ1k1, k2)]. (4.43)
We have the following result.
Proposition 9. The subgame perfect Cournot equilibrium that satisfies the dynamic
programming problem (4.43) is
(cˆAS1 , cˆ
AS
2 ) =
ρ+ λ
ρ+ λ
θ1
g1(τ1)
[
g1(τ1)φ+ 1
θ1φ+ 1
]2 × [g1(τ1)ρk1, ρk2], (4.44)
where g1(τ1) is determined by the following differential equation
g1(τ1) + (1− τ1)g′1(τ1) = 1 +
λ
ρ
[
θ1
g1(τ1)
− x
] [
g1(τ1)φ+ 1
θ1φ+ 1
]2
(4.45)
with boundary condition g1(0) = 1. The value functions of the two players are
Wˆ 1(φ, τ1) =
1
ρ+ λ
[
g1(τ1)φ
g1(τ1)φ+ 1
]
+
λ
ρ(ρ+ λ)
(
θ1φ
θ1φ+ 1
)
,
Wˆ 2(φ, τ1) =
1
ρ+ λ
[
1
g1(τ1)φ+ 1
]
+
λ
ρ(ρ+ λ)
(
1
θ1φ+ 1
)
.
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Proof. See Section 4.6.
Note that boundary condition g1(0) = 1 implies that Cournot equilibrium (4.44)
reduces to the risk-free form (ρk1, ρk2) when τ1 = 0. Also, as claimed before, both Wˆ
1
and Wˆ 2 are homogeneous of degree 0 in (k1, k2) because φ = k1/k2. We will discuss
these results in Proposition 9 after solving the second example.
Example 2
Now we consider the case where the shock affects the entire stock of player 1, k1, and
a portion ks2 of player 2’s stock k2. Let τ2 and θ2 be defined as (4.22) and φ defined as
(4.42), player i solves
Wˆ i(φ, τ2) = e
−λ∆t max
ci
{
∆t
ci
c1 + c2
+ e−ρ∆tWˆ i
(
k1 −∆tc1
k2 −∆tc2 ,
τ2k2 −∆tc2
k2 −∆tc2
)}
+ (1− e−λ∆t)Vˆ i(xk1, θ2k2)
where Vˆ i is given by (4.31). In the limiting case ∆t→ 0 we have
ρWˆ i(φ, τ2) = max
ci
{
ci
c1 + c2
− φWˆ iφ
c1
k1
+
[
φWˆ iφ − (1− τ2)Wˆ iτ2
] c2
k2
}
− λ[Wˆ i(φ, τ2)− Vˆ i(xk1, θ2k2)]. (4.46)
We have the following result.
Proposition 10. The subgame perfect Cournot equilibrium that satisfies the dynamic
programming problem (4.46) is
(cˆAS1 , cˆ
AS
2 ) =
ρ+ λ
ρ+ λ
xθ2
g2(τ2)
[
φ+ g2(τ2)
xφ+ θ2
]2 × [ρk1, g2(τ2)ρk2], (4.47)
where g2(τ2) is determined by the following differential equation
g2(τ2) + (1− τ2)g′2(τ2) = 1 +
λx
ρ
[
θ2
g2(τ2)
− x
] [
φ+ g2(τ2)
xφ+ θ2
]2
(4.48)
with boundary condition g2(0) = 1. The value functions of the two players are
Wˆ 1(φ, τ2) =
1
ρ+ λ
[
φ
φ+ g2(τ2)
]
+
λ
ρ(ρ+ λ)
(
xφ
xφ+ θ2
)
,
Wˆ 2(φ, τ2) =
1
ρ+ λ
[
g2(τ2)
φ+ g2(τ2)
]
+
λ
ρ(ρ+ λ)
(
θ2
xφ+ θ2
)
.
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Proof. See Section 4.6.
Note that the Cournot model (4.46) with τ2 = 0 is equivalent to Cournot model
(4.43) with τ1 = 1. In both cases the entire k1 is under the risk of shock and k2 is
risk-free. Again, as claimed before, both Wˆ 1 and Wˆ 2 are homogeneous of degree 0 in
(k1, k2) because φ = k1/k2.
Distortion in extraction
Unlike the risk-free model (4.31) and the model with symmetric shock (4.35) where the
Pareto optimal solution is not distorted, Cournot models with asymmetric shock such
as (4.43) and (4.46) have equilibra that are not Pareto optimal. Ren and Polasky [47]
discussed the following representative consumer’s problem with asymmetric shock
ρW (ks, kn) = max
c
{u(c)−Wks(ks, kn)c} − λ[W (ks, kn)− V (xks + kn)], (4.49)
where V is given by (4.39), ks = ks1 in the first example, k
s = k1 + k
s
2 in the second
period and kn = k1 + k2 − ks = k − ks. They found that the Pareto optimal solution
satisfies
cAS =
1− (1− x)[(1− τ)/θ]1+λ/ρ
1− (1− x)[(1− τ)/θ] ρk, (4.50)
where τ and θ are given as (4.26). As in the two-period model (4.24), the Pareto optimal
solution in the infinite horizon model also follows a sequential plan where ks is extracted
before kn.
Figure 4.4 plots Cournot equilibria (4.44) and (4.47) of the two examples and com-
pares them with the Pareto solution (4.50) with the same values of k, ρ(β) and x used
in the two-period model In left, middle and right panels of Figure 4.4 we show results
when φ = k1/k2 = 1/2, 1, 2, respectively. Equilibrium (4.44) of the first example is
plotted on the left part of each panel against ks1 and equilibrium (4.47) of the second
example is plotted on the right part of each panel against ks2. The top and middle
panels show the individual strategies. In the bottom panel the solid line is the aggre-
gate extraction in Cournot equilibrium and the dashed line is the corresponding Pareto
optimal extraction.
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From the top and middle panels in Figure 4.4 we can see that the pattern of indi-
vidual strategies in equilibrium depends on the relative size of the stocks own by two
Cournot players. In either of the two examples, when the asymmetric shock causes one
player to increase extraction, the competitor who holds sufficiently large stock would
extract more, but not otherwise. For instance, example 1 in Panel (a) shows that asym-
metric shock causes player 1 to increase extraction when risky stock ks1 is relatively
small. In this case player 2 also increase extraction because k2 is sufficiently large as
compared to k1 (k1/k2 = 1/2). However, in Panels (b) and (c) player 2 extracts less
when k2 becomes relatively smaller (k1/k2 = 1 or 2). Example 2 in Panels (a) and (b)
are cases where the asymmetric shock causes player 2 to increase extraction when ks2
is relatively small. Because k1 is sufficiently small as compared to k2 in these cases
(k1/k2 = 1/2 or 1), player 1 extracts less in equilibrium. However, Panel (c) shows that
when k1 becomes sufficiently large (k1/k2 = 2), player 1 extracts more in response to
the increase of player 2’s extraction.
The bottom panels in Figure 4.4 shows that the Pareto optimal solution could be
distorted by Cournot competition with asymmetric shock. The distortion in quantity
is also accompanied by a distortion in the order of extraction. In example 1, player
2 always extracts the risk-free stock k2 simultaneously with player 1’s extraction of
the risky stock ks1. This violates the Pareto optimal solution that requires exhausting
ks1 before any positive amount of risk-free stock is extracted. In example 2, although
both player extract risky stock, the Pareto optimal quantity still could be distorted by
Cournot competition. We can see that the direction and scale of the distortion depends
on the relative size of stocks owned by two players and the share of the risky stock.
4.4 Long-term impact of shock
The distortion from Cournot competition has a persistent impact on the transition path
of extraction and resource stock, and therefore leads to a loss in social welfare.
4.4.1 Transition path
We now discuss how the transition path is distorted in the two examples using special
cases where the initial stock and risk distributions between two players are as marked
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on the bottom figure of Panel (b) in Figure 4.4.
The special case of the first example, with initial condition Kˆ0 = (k1, k
s
1o, k2), has
transition path given by
(Cˆ, Kˆ) =(Cˆt, Kˆt)t≥0 (4.51)
Cˆt =
(
cˆ1t
cˆ2t
)
is determined by (4.44)
dKˆt =

dkˆ1t
dkˆs1t
dkˆ2t
 = −

cˆ1t
cˆ1t × I{kˆs1t > 0}
cˆ2t
 ,
where I is an indicator function equal to 1 if the condition in the brackets is true
and 0 otherwise. For the second example, the transition path with initial condition
Kˆ0 = (k1, k2, k
s
2o) is given by
(Cˆ, Kˆ) =(Cˆt, Kˆt)t≥0 (4.52)
Cˆt =
(
cˆ1t
cˆ2t
)
is determined by (4.47)
dKˆt =

dkˆ1t
dkˆ2t
dkˆs2t
 = −

cˆ1t
cˆ2t
cˆ2t × I{kˆs2t > 0}
 .
The transition path that follows Pareto optimal solution, with initial condition K0 =
(k, ks), is given by
(C, K) =(ct, Kt)t≥0 (4.53)
ct is determined by (4.50)
dKt =
(
dkt
dkst
)
= −
(
ct
ct × I{kst > 0}
)
.
These transition paths, from either Cournot equilibrium or Pareto solution, are ex
ante in the sense that the potential asymmetric shock is known to the Cournot players
or representative consumer but has not occurred yet. Figure 4.5 compares (4.51) and
(4.52) with (4.53). The left panel plots the special case for the first example and the
right panel plots the special case for the second example.
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The transition path (4.51) in the first example has initial condition (k1, k
s
1o, k2)
where k1 = k2 = k/2 and k
s
1o is marked on Figure 4.4 Panel (b). In this case Figure 4.4
shows that player 1 extracts more than player 2 initially. During the early stage of the
transition path, the left panel of Figure 4.5 shows that the asymmetric shock that only
affects player 1’s risky stock ks1o causes player 1 to extract more than player 2 (top panel),
leading to faster decrease of k1 than k2 (middle panel) and decreasing k1/k2. When the
remainder of ks1o becomes sufficiently small as compared to k1, cˆ1 decreases much faster
than earlier but the decreasing rate of cˆ2 changes little. After k
s
1o is exhausted, the risk
of shock is eliminated and Cournot competition has no distorting effect (Proposition 8).
In this risk-free stage k1 is smaller than k2 because k1 is more aggressively extracted in
the earlier risky stage, leading to persistently lower cˆ1 as compared to cˆ2 in the long-run.
The bottom left panel of Figure 4.5 plots the transition path of aggregate extraction
in Cournot equilibrium of the first example and the corresponding Pareto optimal ex-
traction path given by (4.53). Because the Pareto path requires higher initial extraction
from the risky stock ks1o than player 1 extracts in Cournot equilibrium, the exhaustion of
ks1o is sooner on the Pareto path. The Pareto optimal extraction, although higher dur-
ing the initial period, decreases at a faster rate initially and then is below the Cournot
extraction path over an extended period of time. When ks1o is exhausted by player 1,
the remainder path of the aggregate extraction in Cournot equilibrium is efficient con-
ditioned on the remaining stock but is persistently lower than the Pareto path because
Cournot competition causes more aggressive extraction earlier.
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Figure 4.5: Transition path with an asymmetric shock
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The right panel of Figure 4.5 plots the transition path (4.52) of the second example
with the initial condition (k1, k2, k
s
2o) as marked on Figure 4.4 Panel (b). In this case
the asymmetric shock affects player 1’s entire stock k1 and a portion k
s
2o of player 2’s
stock k2. The asymmetric risk on k2 causes player 2 to extract more than player 1
initially (top panel). This leads to faster decrease of k2 than k1 (middle panel) and
increasing k1/k2. As the share of k
s
2o in k2 decreases, player 2’s extraction decreases but
player 1’s extraction increases over time. After ks2o is exhausted, the transition path
enters a fully specialized stage where player 2’s stock becomes completely risk-free but
player 1’s stock is fully risky. In this case, (4.47) with g2(0) = 1 implies that both player
extract a same constant fraction from their available stocks. Thus k1 and k2 decreases
at same rate and k2 is persistently lower than k1, leading to persistently lower cˆ2 than
cˆ1 in the long-run.
Comparing the aggregate extraction in the Cournot equilibrium and the correspond-
ing Pareto optimal solution given by (4.53), the bottom right panel of Figure 4.5 shows
that the distortion is very limited initially. However, as the remainder of ks2o in k2 be-
comes smaller, Cournot competition causes greater distortion compared to the optimal
extraction on the Pareto path. Because the entire k1 is affected by the potential shock,
the risky stock is never exhausted along the Cournot path in the second example. Thus
the asymmetric shock affects the entire Cournot equilibrium transition path, which is
inefficient even after ks2o is exhausted by player 2. This causes persistent distortion
because on the Pareto path the risky stock (k1 +k
s
2o) would be exhausted in finite time.
Figure 4.5 shows that in our special case the Pareto path of extraction is lower than
the Cournot path in the long-run. But according to (4.47), the long-run relative levels
of Pareto path and Cournot path depend on model parameters.
4.4.2 Welfare loss
The distortion in extraction caused by Cournot competition with potential asymmetric
shock leads to a loss in social welfare. Because the occurrence of the shock is stochastic,
social welfare is measured as an ex ante expectation. This is different from the two-
period model where the shock occurs deterministically.
Suppose the occurrence of potential shock is realized at T ≥ 0, then according to
(4.34) the probability of this special case is Λ(T ). After the occurrence the remainder of
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the resource stock and corresponding transition path become risk-free, and by Propo-
sition 8 Cournot competition would not cause any loss in social welfare. Then for this
special case, the social welfare from Cournot path (4.51) in the first example is
Πˆ(Cˆ |T ) =
∫ T
0
e−ρt log(cˆ1t + cˆ2t)dt+ e−ρTV (θ1kˆ1T + kˆ2T )
where V is the risk-free value function given by (4.39) with γ → 1 and θ1 is given by
(4.18). Then, as in Reed [44] and Reed [45], the expected social welfare is
Πˆ(Cˆ) =
∫ ∞
0
Πˆ(Cˆ |T )dΛ(T )
=
∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ+λ)t[log(cˆ1t + cˆ2t) + λV (θ1kˆ1t + kˆ2t)]dt. (4.54)
Similarly, the expected social welfare from Cournot path (4.52) in the second example
is
Πˆ(Cˆ) =
∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ+λ)t[log(cˆ1t + cˆ2t) + λV (xkˆ1t + θ2kˆ2t)]dt (4.55)
where θ2 is given by (4.22). For the Pareto transition path (4.53) the maximized social
welfare is measured by
Π(C) =
∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ+λ)t[log ct + λV (θkt)]dt (4.56)
where θ is given by (4.26). According to the standard argument of principle of optimal-
ity, Π(C) given by (4.56) is equivalent to W (ks, kn) given by (4.49).
Using welfare measures (4.54) and (4.55) we calculate the social welfare from the
Cournot path and compare it with the Pareto optimal solution (4.56) in Figure 4.6. The
results are plotted against the share of risky stock based on the parameters used before
in each of the three panels for k1/k2 = 1/2, 1 or 2.
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Figure 4.6: Welfare loss in the infinite horizon model
k1/k2 = 1/2
k1/k2 = 1
k1/k2 = 2
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Figure 4.6 shows that, in general an increase in the share of stock under the threat
of shock leads to lower welfare. This is true for both Cournot equilibrium and Pareto
optimal solution. As predicted by Proposition 8, there is no loss in social welfare in the
Cournot equilibrium as compared to the Pareto optimal outcome when the risky stock
is 0 (no shock) or the entire k is under the risk (symmetric shock).
However, Cournot competition causes positive welfare losses when the risk only
affects a portion but not all of the stock. Given k1 and k2, an increase in the share of
risky stock ks1 in k1 leads to higher welfare loss. This result occurs because player 1
exhausts the risky stock ks1 in longer time when k
s
1/k1 is higher, so that there is longer
period of time when player 1’s extraction is constrained by risk and Cournot equilibrium
extraction is therefore distorted. The largest welfare loss occurs when ks1 increases to k1.
In this case player 1’s entire stock is risky thus the risky stock will never be exhausted.
In this case the whole transition path is distorted by Cournot competition.
When a positive share of player 2’s stock k2 is also affected by potential shock, the
welfare loss decreases as the share of risky stock ks2 in k2 increases. This result occurs
because, as shown on Figure 4.4, when the the potential shock affects a relatively large
share of player 2’s stock, the distortion of aggregate extraction is very small. Thus the
distortion on transition path is small over prolonged time until player 2 significantly
reduces the share of the risky stock when the distortion on extraction becomes large.
This leads to lower welfare loss because the larger distortion in the further future is
heavily discounted. When player 2 initially has a relatively small share of risky stock,
the distortion is much larger for the entire transition path, leading to larger welfare loss.
4.5 Conclusion
We studied the effect of a shock on Cournot competition in an exhaustible resource
market. We considered symmetric and asymmetric shocks separately. In the case of a
symmetric shock, we showed that Cournot equilibrium coincides with the Pareto optimal
outcome with isoelastic demand and zero extraction cost. This result occurs because,
similar to the risk-free monopolistic model of Stiglitz [59], Cournot players make ex-
traction decisions based on quantity dependent marginal revenue which is proportional
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to the market price and the proportion only depends on the constant elasticity of de-
mand. Thus with constant elasticity the distortion effect cancels out across time and
the Cournot equilibrium is therefore equivalent to the Pareto optimal decision.Without
distortion, the maximum social welfare from the Pareto optimal solution is achieve in
Cournot equilibrium.
However, we found that Cournot competition distorts the Pareto optimal solution in
many cases when the risk of shock affects the Cournot players’ stocks asymmetrically.
We used two examples and showed that the direction and scale of distortion in extraction
are complicated and depend on the relative size of the stocks owned by two players and
the share of stock that is under the risk of shock.
With an asymmetric shock, Cournot competition is distorting and has persistent
impact on the transition path and therefore leads to a loss in social welfare. In our
examples we showed that when the shock only affects a portion of one player’s stock
and has no impact on the other player’s stock, the welfare loss is increasing in the share
of risky stock. This result occurs because it takes a longer time for the first player to
exhaust risky stock when its share is larger and eliminate the distortion that occurs
while there is an asymmetric shock. However, when the risk of shock also affects a
portion of the second player’s stock, the welfare loss starts to decrease in the share of
risky stock. In this case the distortion is tiny when a relatively large portion of the
second player’s stock is risky, and not significant until a sufficient amount of the risky
stock is extracted. Thus higher share of risky stock causes lower welfare loss because
the distortion is small over prolonged time of the initial part of the transition path and
the larger distortion in the further future is heavily discounted. In our examples the
largest welfare loss occurs in the fully specialized case where the first player owns all
the risky stock and second player owns all the risk-free stock. This is because the first
player will never exhaust the risky stock and the whole transition path is under the risk
of asymmetric shock.
We kept our model lean to derive analytical results that focus on the allocation of
risk. Doing so meat neglecting some other interesting issues. First, we assume a simple
market structure with two Cournot players where each of them owns a private stock.
Thus our model has very limited implication to the common property problem or to the
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cartel-fringe models.10 In addition, the risk in our model is characterized by a single-
time irreversible shock with constant hazard rate. This simplification ignores some
real world complications including time-varying risks and multiple potential shocks.
Moreover, our model treats exhaustible resource as the final consumption good thus
the consumption and utility flow converge to zero asymptotically. A more sophisticated
model that could generate sustainable growth must also include the reproducible capital
and consider an exhaustible resource as an intermediate input. These extensions would
enhance the model’s predictions and could be appropriate directions for future research.
4.6 Technical proof
Proof of Proposition 9. Let (c1t, c2t)t≥0 denote the subgame perfect Cournot equi-
librium that satisfies the dynamic programming problem (4.43), we have
W 1(φ, τ1) +W
2(φ, τ1) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
c1t
c1t + c2t
dt+
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
c2t
c1t + c2t
dt =
1
ρ
.
Thus
W 1φ +W
2
φ = 0 and W
1
τ1 +W
2
τ1 = 0.
Then the first order conditions of (4.43) imply
Player 1
c2
(c1 + c2)2
=
φW 1φ
k1
+
(1− τ1)W 1τ1
k1
= −φW
2
φ
k1
− (1− τ1)W
2
τ1
k1
(4.57)
Player 2
c1
(c1 + c2)2
= −φW
2
φ
k2
=
φW 1φ
k2
. (4.58)
Substituting (4.57) and (4.58) into (4.43) we find
W 1(φ, τ1) =
1
ρ+ λ
(
c1
c1 + c2
)
+
λ
ρ(ρ+ λ)
(
θ1φ
θ1φ+ 1
)
(4.59)
W 2(φ, τ1) =
1
ρ+ λ
(
c2
c1 + c2
)
+
λ
ρ(ρ+ λ)
(
1
θ1φ+ 1
)
(4.60)
where the second term on the right hand side of both equations are according to (4.33)
with γ = 1 and (4.42). Taking a guess that
c1
c2
= g1(τ1)φ, (4.61)
10 This literature is from the pioneering work of Salant [49] and followed by many other authors
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we can solve W 1φ , W
1
τ1 and W
2
φ from (4.59) and (4.60). Then (4.57) and (4.58) imply
g1(τ1)k1 + k2
c1 + c2
(4.62)
Player 1 =
g1(τ1) + (1− τ1)g′(τ1)
ρ+ λ
+
λx
ρ(ρ+ λ)
[
g1(τ1)φ+ 1
θ1φ+ 1
]2
Player 2 =
1
ρ+ λ
+
λ
ρ(ρ+ λ)
θ1
g1(τ1)
[
g1(τ1)φ+ 1
θ1φ+ 1
]2
.
The second equality of (4.62) yields (4.45) which is a differential equation in τ1. The
boundary condition of g1(τ1) is set as g1(0) = 1 to ensure that Cournot equilibrium
(4.44) reduces to the risk-free form (ρk1, ρk2) when τ1 = 0. Then using (4.61) and
(4.62) we can solve (4.44).
Proof of Proposition 10. Similar as the proof of Proposition 9, we have
W 1(φ, τ2) =
1
ρ+ λ
(
c1
c1 + c2
)
+
λ
ρ(ρ+ λ)
(
xφ
xφ+ θ2
)
(4.63)
W 2(φ, τ2) =
1
ρ+ λ
(
c2
c1 + c2
)
+
λ
ρ(ρ+ λ)
(
θ2
xφ+ θ2
)
(4.64)
Taking a guess that
c1
c2
=
φ
g2(τ2)
, (4.65)
the first order conditions of (4.46) imply
k1 + g2(τ2)k2
c1 + c2
(4.66)
Player 1 =
1
ρ+ λ
+
λx
ρ(ρ+ λ)
θ2
g2(τ2)
[
φ+ g2(τ2)
xφ+ θ2
]2
Player 2 =
g2(τ2) + (1− τ2)g′(τ2)
ρ+ λ
+
λx2
ρ(ρ+ λ)
[
φ+ g2(τ2)
xφ+ θ2
]2
.
The second equality of (4.66) yields (4.48) which is a differential equation in τ2. To
verify the boundary condition of g2(τ2) is g2(0) = 1, note that Cournot model (4.46)
with τ2 = 0 is equivalent to Cournot model (4.43) with τ1 = 1. Thus g2(0) = g1(1).
When τ1 = 1, (4.18) shows that θ1 = x. Then given g
′
1(1) ∈ R, using (4.45) we find
g1(1) = 1 and [1 + g1(1)φ]
2 + g1(1)ρ(1 +xφ)
2/(λx) = 0. Both solutions of the quadratic
function are negative and therefore dropped. Then using (4.65) and (4.66) we can solve
(4.47).
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This dissertation includes three closely related essays on natural resource management
with a potential regime shift. The first essay shows that the risk of a potential regime
shift could cause the optimal management of renewable resources to be precautionary,
unchanged, or aggressive as compared to the risk-free case. Which of these outcomes
occur depends on the relative magnitudes of three competing effects: the risk reduction
effect, the consumption smoothing effect, and the investment effect. Both the risk
reduction effect and the consumption smoothing effect cause management to be more
precautionary. The investment effect has the opposite impact and causes management
to be more aggressive. An analytical condition is provided that shows when aggressive
management will occur. This result is in contrast with recent papers where a regime shift
will cause management to be more precautionary [15, 42]. In a numerical simulation
it is shown that a potential regime shift can generate more aggressive management
for reasonable parameter values. In particular, a regime shift that lowers the carrying
capacity of the renewable resource is more likely to cause aggressive management. In
contrast, management tends to be more precautionary with a potential regime shift that
lowers the intrinsic growth rate.
The second essay analyzes optimal management under the risk of asymmetric regime
shift, which is simplified as a shock that reduces the stock of an exhaustible resource.
Without extraction cost, the optimal management under asymmetric shock requires a
sequential extraction plan which first exhausts the stock that is under the threat of
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shock. Under this pattern of management, the optimal extraction rate changes non-
monotonically in the share of risky stock, due to the change in the relative magnitude
of the substitution effect and the income effect caused by the risk of shock. With log
utility, it is shown that when the share of risky stock is relatively low, an increase in
the share of risky stock leads to higher extraction. However, when the share of risky
stock is sufficiently high, further increase of it provides incentive to extract less. This
result is used to analyze the transition path. With the risk of asymmetric shock, the
optimal extraction is higher than the risk-free case initially, leading to faster decrease
of resource stock and persistently lower extraction in the future.
The third essay applies the asymmetric regime shift model of exhaustible resource in
a duopolistic market. In the benchmark model of symmetric risk, Cournot equilibrium
coincides with the Pareto optimal outcome for the case with isoelastic demand and zero
extraction cost. However, Cournot competition distorts the Pareto optimal solution in
many cases when the risk of shock affects the Cournot players’ stocks asymmetrically.
Some examples are used to show that the direction and scale of distortion could be
complicated and depend on the relative size of the stocks owned by two players and
the share of stock that is under the risk of shock. Asymmetric risk has impacts on the
extraction path and leads to a loss in social welfare. In the case where the shock only
affects a portion of one player’s stock and has no impact on the other player’s stock,
welfare loss is increasing in the share of risky stock. The largest welfare loss occurs
in the fully specialized case where the first player owns all the risky stock and second
player owns all the risk-free stock. When the risk of shock is further spread out to affect
a portion of the second player’s stock, welfare loss starts to decrease in the share of
risky stock.
While this dissertation investigates several important effects of potential regime
shift on natural resource management, the results could be expanded in a number of
dimensions. For example, regime shifts discussed in this dissertation are all on the
supply side and have no direct impact on the utility function and corresponding demand;
the risk is charactered by simple reduced form hazard function that has no explanatory
power on the underlying mechanisms that govern regime shifts; the occurrence of regime
shift is simplified as a single-time irreversible event thus repeating events with the
potential to flip back and forth among regimes are ignored. Addressing these limits
105
could be appropriate directions for future research.
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